Russian Hajj. Empire and the Pilgrimage to Mecca - Eileen Kane

(John Hannent) #1

34 Chapter One


Ottoman lands. According to eighteenth-century treaty agreements with the
Ottomans (the Capitulations), Russia, like other European powers, was allowed
to open consulates “wherever it had interests” in Ottoman lands, and its sub-
jects were entitled to extraterritorial privileges.^50 These included immunities
from Ottoman taxes and laws. Scholars tend to think of the Capitulations most
often with regard to Russia’s Orthodox Christian subjects, but in fact they
applied to all Russian subjects in Ottoman lands, regardless of religious faith.
Ottoman sources reveal that some of Russia’s Muslims began to take advantage
of these privileges as soon as they were introduced at the end of the eighteenth
century. Ottoman archives hold petitions from the Russian ambassador in
Constantinople on behalf of Russian Muslims who complained of mistreat-
ment by Ottoman officials while making the hajj.^51 As Beirut consul, Bazili rou-
tinely provided legal assistance to Russian subjects of all faiths, intervening on
their behalf with the Ottoman authorities when they were the victims of crime,
and acting as arbiter in their financial negotiations with Ottoman subjects.
And yet, it is also clear that Bazili went to extraordinary lengths for these
pilgrims from the North Caucasus. He helped them even though they had no
documents to prove they were Russian subjects, and in spite of their disregard
for warnings from tsarist officials against making the hajj that year, “through a
country at war.” And his insistence on tracking down and punishing the Bed-
ouin attackers, while ultimately successful, was costly to the Ottoman authori-
ties in Damascus. Toward the end of the case, an exasperated Nejib Pasha
complained to Bazili that he had gone “above and beyond his duty” in this case,
and that his investigation had already cost his government far more than the
pilgrims lost in the attack.^52
Correspondence surrounding this case reveals that Bazili saw strategic value
in supporting the Dagestani pilgrims. He told Titov he had “lavished” care on
them in part because they belonged to the “house of the famous Aslan Khan,
prince of the Kazikumukhs in Dagestan.”^53 Bazili had intimate knowledge of
the Caucasus. Before being posted to Syria, he had served in the Caucasus on a
Foreign Ministry committee tasked to develop a plan for governance of the
region. He knew firsthand about Russia’s ongoing efforts to put down rebellions
and establish control over the predominantly Muslim North Caucasus, by
identifying and recruiting Muslim elites into the Russian administration.^54 His
attention to this particular case, and comments to Titov, suggest that he had
broader imperial agendas in mind in helping this group, and that his decision
was shaped by Russia’s ongoing efforts to establish a stable government in the
Caucasus.

Free download pdf