http://www.bjreview.com MARCH 12, 2020 BEIJING REVIEW 21
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Second, the role of the Afghan Central
Government has been reduced. The U.S. had
stressed the necessity of direct talks between
the Afghan Government and the Taliban. But
the Taliban rejected the idea and maintained
that peace could only be realized through
negotiations with the U.S., since it considers
the Afghan Government a puppet regime sup-
ported by the U.S. and therefore reasons that
contact with it is meaningless. In the peace deal,
the U.S. gives up its claim by introducing Afghan
government representatives to the negotiation
table. Although the deal calls for talks between
the Taliban and the Afghan Government to
address internal political issues, uncertainties
remain and the future is still far from clear.
Third, there is no ceasefire control
mechanism in the deal. Although the U.S. en-
courages the Taliban to approach the Afghan
Government after its military withdrawal, there
are no compulsory measures for the Taliban to
do so. The post-U.S. exit military vacuum could
be filled by conflicts among different military
groups. It should be noted that the Taliban is
not a coherent political and military organiza-
tion. Divisions and competition among different
factions are salient, and the peace deal may not
be accepted by all Taliban leaders. Any strikes
and attacks launched by Taliban militants
against Afghan government targets could lead
to overall confrontation and destroy the already
fragile peace prospects.
However, the U.S. military withdrawal is cer-
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and Afghan government troops, or between
the Taliban and the U.S., would not reverse U.S.
President Donald Trump’s pullout decision.Challenges ahead
If the peace deal is fully accepted by the
Afghan Government, it means that the
Taliban would be incorporated into the
government system, which could be a sig-
nificant blow to the secular political arena
in the country. Given the powerful presence
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its participation in state administration will
force many leading political factions in
central and local governments to give up
some power, which is unlikely. Meanwhile,
the process requires close coordination and
consensus among different political factions
with widening differences which could make
it an impossible task.
Disagreements and divisions among
different political factions in the AfghanGovernment are prominent. President
Mohammad Ashraf Ghani is facing a chal-
lenge from his major opponent, Abdullah
Abdullah, who was former chief executive
officer of Afghanistan. After losing his sec-
ond presidential bid in the recent election,
Abdullah has, however, alleged electoral
fraud and is trying to establish a parallel
government to challenge the Ghani ad-
ministration. Surrounded and supported by
large groups of opponents and dissidents,
Abdullah’s base of followers is considerable
large and could threaten Ghani’s authority.
Meanwhile, the Ghani administration’s
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areas, with the gap between it and provincial
authorities growing after the deal. Many provin-
cial governments are controlled or influenced
by local military groups and strong tribal clans,
which can be traced back to the 1980s when
they resisted the Soviet Union’s invasion. After
1996, when the Taliban controlled nearly all
parts of Afghanistan, these factions continued
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the help of the U.S. in 2003.
The hostility between these local groups
and the Taliban is still very strong and it is
impossible for them to accept major political
concessions to the Taliban or share power with
it. Local groups and clans treat many provinces
as their dominions, and orders from central
authorities are not observed. With the emphasis
on negotiations between the Taliban and the
Afghan Government in the deal, many local
leaders may resist it and seek to protect them-
selves, thus the divisions between the central
and local governments could deepen.
In addition, the withdrawal of U.S.-led
troops may provo ke a new round of com-
petition between regional countries. India
and Iran are the Afghan Government’s major
supporters, and both see the Taliban as an
extremist movement. Pakistan hopes to
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consolidating ties with the Taliban, its tradi-
tional ally. Russia and Central Asian states will
closely monitor the situation and hope that
the Taliban will not support extremists on
their territories.
The peace deal is a major diplomatic victory
for the Taliban, while it helps Trump fulfill his
promise in the 2016 presidential campaign to
bring U.S. military personnel home. However,
the future of Afghanistan is still unclear. After 18
years of intervention in Afghanistan, the U.S. is
leaving without a proper and secured mecha-
nism for the Afghan people, and a new round
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horizon. QXINHUAFighters of the Islamic State extremist group turn themselves in to the Afghan Government on March 2