The EconomistFebruary 22nd 2020 451T
hese daysit is notable when both Re-
publicans and Democrats oppose a for-
eign policy of Donald Trump’s in strident
unison. When it was reported that Mark
Esper, the secretary of defence, was set to
remove American forces from the Sahel,
where jihadists have been wreaking havoc
across a vast swathe of Africa, members of
Congress reacted angrily together, arguing
vigorously against such a course.
A few weeks later Mike Pompeo, the sec-
retary of state, sounding ambivalent on the
matter, set off on the first tour of sub-Saha-
ran Africa by any member of Mr Trump’s
cabinet for a year and a half. The carefully
chosen countries were Senegal, Angola and
Ethiopia. Mr Pompeo made friendly noises
in all three. The Senegalese urged America
not to withdraw from the Sahel. In oil-rich
Angola Mr Pompeo encouraged trading
with America rather than China and
warned against corruption. In Ethiopia he
praised the Nobel-prize-winning prime
minister for making peace and privatising
bits of the economy.
But few Africa hands reckon the recent
visit will mark a change of policy in the
White House. Donald Trump has made no
bones about his lack of interest in Africa.
The continent is full of what he has de-
scribed as “shit-hole countries”, one of
them apparently called “Nambia”. Mr
Trump took a year and a half to appoint an
assistant secretary of state for African af-
fairs and even longer to find an ambassa-
dor to South Africa, one of the top dip-
lomatic posts south of the Sahara. That
appointee is known mockingly, even
among Republicans, as “the handbag lady”,since her expertise is in fashion, not diplo-
macy (she has a country-club friendship
with Mr Trump). In three years he has re-
ceived only two of his African counterparts
in the White House (Nigeria’s Muham-
madu Buhari and Kenya’s Uhuru Kenyatta).
Recently he has sharply restricted immi-
gration from Nigeria and started talks
about a free-trade deal with Kenya. Little
wonder that no one seems to know what
American policy towards Africa actually is.
The last time one took shape was two
years into the presidential term, when
John Bolton, then the national security ad-
viser, spelt out a strategy. Its main shift
from Barack Obama’s was to stress a viru-
lently hostile attitude to China in Africa
and a scarcely less bellicose one to Russia.
“China uses bribes, opaque agreements,
and the strategic use of debt to hold states
in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and de-
mands,” he said, deploring China’s “ulti-
mate goal of advancing Chinese global
dominance”. He also articulated a more
transactional approach to Africa, in keep-
ing with Mr Trump’s worldview. “All us aid
on the continent will advance us interests,”
he stated baldly. Democracy and human
rights were barely mentioned.
Since Mr Bolton’s abrupt removal from
office last year, this policy—in the absence
of any other grand statements—is pre-
sumed to persist. But no one is sure. Mr
Pompeo was careful, on his tour, not to ex-
press any change of heart within the ad-American policy in Africa
A strategy on autopilot
WASHINGTON, DC
Donald Trump isn’t interested in Africa. His secretary of state and his diplomats
struggle to make amends
Middle East & Africa
46 Voting in Africa
47 Delivering letters in Congo
47 South Sudan’s 12th peace deal
48 Egypt sends Jews mixed signals
50 Arab states and the IMFAlso in this section