Visit bit.ly/2dC85K1 for a larger version of this table.
Adiaphora (ἀδιάφορα): indifferent things; neither good nor bad in an absolute moral sense. In
Stoic thought, all things outside our sphere of reasoned choice (see prohairesis) are indifferent. In a
relative sense, some of the things outside our control are preferred or dispreferred goods
(proêgmena/aproêgmena). Marcus says (5.20) that people who thwart the progress of our reasoned
choice, although normally our natural concern, also become indifferent to us. The term appears in
Epictetus’s Discourses seventeen times and once in Enchiridion; see Discourses 2.19.12b–13 and
3.3.1. In Marcus it appears six times; see also 8.56 (my prohairesis is indifferent to that of others, and
vice versa).
Agathos (ἀγαθός): good, or a proper object of desire. Epictetus upholds the classic Stoic position
when he says that the good (and evil) are only to be found in us, in our prohairesis, not in external
things (Discourses 2.16.1), and when he says, “God laid down this law, saying: if you want some
good, get it from yourself” (1.29.4). “Protect your own good in all that you do” (4.3.11).
Anthrôpos (ἄνθρωπος): a human being, human beings in general. For Epictetus (Discourses
2.10.1), above all we are human beings whose power of reasoned choice (prohairesis) supervises all