the daily stoic

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and is completely free. A “beautiful human being” possesses the virtues (Discourses 3.1.6b–9). We
must be a “unified human being” (Discourses 3.15.13), what Hadot calls self-coherence (The Inner
Citadel, pp. 130–31). In Marcus (see 5.1, 5.20, 8.1, 8.5, 8.26), the term is used in conjunction with an
emphasis on what our proper concern and work should be.


Apatheia (ἀπάθεια): passionless calm, peace of mind. In verb form, ἀπαθέω means to free from
passion. Epictetus: Discourses (seven times noun, eleven times verb), see 4.3.8; twice in Enchiridion.
Marcus uses it in verb form four times; see 6.16.2b–4a. In its single use as a noun, he says that the
closer a person is to apatheia, the stronger they are (11.18.5b). See pathos.


Aphormê (ἀφορμή): avoidance, disinclination, the impulse not to act (as a result of ekklisis).
Opposite of hormê. Hormê/Aphormê is the second of the three areas of training for Epictetus (3.2.1–
3a), and the term appears frequently in the Discourses. Marcus doesn’t use the term in this sense,
only hormê.


Apotynchanô (ἀποτυγχάνω): to fail in gaining, hitting, achieving; to miss one’s purpose or to
err. It appears twenty-four times in Epictetus, often with orexis/oregô; see especially 3.2.1–3a.
Diogenes Laertius says Zeno defined “want” as failing to gain what we yearn for or reach out for
(Lives of the Eminent Philosophers 7.1.113). The term doesn’t appear in Marcus. This experience is a
fundamental source of disturbance in life. See also hamartanô.
Aproêgmena (ἀπροηγμένα): dispreferred things; indifferent in an absolute moral sense, but
things of relative negative value and naturally undesirable things, such as illness. Opposite of
proêgmena. These terms don’t appear in either Epictetus or Marcus, but we know from Diogenes
Laertius that they were common Stoic teaching from Zeno and Chrysippus through Posidonius (Lives
of the Eminent Philosophers 7.1.102ff). Cicero rehearses Zeno’s use of the terms and offers the Latin
equivalents of reiecta/praeposita (On the Ends of Good and Evil and Academica, 1 .X.36–39). Seneca
does not follow Cicero in this use, but uses commoda/incommoda (advantageous/disadvantageous).
“There are things in life which are advantageous and disadvantageous—both beyond our control”
(Moral Letters 92.16). Cicero makes it a subclass of reiecta/praeposita (On the Ends of Good and
Evil 3.21).


Aretê (ἀρετή): Virtue, goodness, and human excellence; the source of absolute value. Hadot
notes that the four cardinal virtues of Plato are not fully present in Arrian’s presentation of Epictetus
(The Inner Citadel, p. 238), but that in Marcus, who followed Epictetus closely, they have a clear
articulation and correlation to what Hadot calls “the three acts of the soul” (see chart). Diogenes
Laertius says that the four cardinal virtues were primary for the Stoics (Lives of the Eminent
Philosophers, “Zeno,” 7.92b): σωφροσύνη/sôphrosunê/self-control, δικαιοσύνη/dikaiosunê/justice,
ἀνδρεία/andreia/courage, φρόνησις/phronêsis/wisdom. Chrysippus said that experiencing wisdom
(phronimos) for even a moment is equal to an eternity of exercising aretê (Plutarch, Moralia 1062 ).
Musonius Rufus said, “The human being is born with an inclination toward virtue” (Lectures 1.7.1–
2). Marcus mentions all four virtues in 3.6.1 and 5.12, and three (without courage) in 7.63, 8.32, and
12.15. We present them here as the aims of moral progress to which all our activity in the world is
directed. Marcus says we should let our virtues shine until we are extinguished (12.15). Epictetus
does cite justice and self-control together in his discussion of virtue in 3.1.6b–9, where his use of
σωφροσύνη is milder in the “even-tempered” sense (contrasted by him with “undisciplined”), and his
preferred term for self-control here (and elsewhere, appearing with wisdom/φρονίμῳ in 2.21.9) is
ἐγκρατεῖς/egkrateis/mastery, or exercising control over (contrasted with
ἀκρατεῖς/akrateis/uncontrolled). Seneca uses the Latin virtus and says that “virtue is the only good”
and is nothing less than “true and steadfast judgment” (Moral Letters 7.32).

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