For in that is the key to everything. Whatever else remains, be it in the power of your choice or not, is
but a corpse and smoke” (12.33).
Heimarmenê (εἱμαρμένη): fate, destiny. Stoics were compatibilists about the free will and
determinism question—all things are determined, but our response is entirely our own. See pronoia.
Hexis (ἕξις): abstract noun built on echein, to have, possess; a state of mind or habit,
disposition toward something; of physical things, a natural property or tendency. Epictetus says
that habits must be “first weakened and then obliterated” (Discourses 2.18.11b–14); otherwise, they
become fuel for personal destruction (2.18.4–5). See ethos.
Hormê (ὁρμή): positive impulse or appetite toward an object (as a result of orexis and our
assent) that leads to action; the opposite of aphormê. These can be irrational impulses to act or a
reasoned choice to act or exert effort toward an end. Quoting Epictetus, Marcus says that we “must
pay special attention to the sphere of our impulses—that they are subject to reservation
, to the common good (κοινωνικαί), and that they are in proportion to actual worth
” (11.37). This is the second level of self-coherence that gives rise to our actions (see chart).
Marcus repeatedly ties the discipline of hormê to acts for the common good (see also 8.7) and the
claims of justice (4.22). It appears thirty-four times in Epictetus’s Discourses, three times in the
Enchiridion, and thirty-five times in Marcus. Seneca uses the Latin equivalent impetus seventy-nine
times in his letters (see Moral Letters 71.32, where he says virtue resides in our judgment, which
gives rise to impulse and clarifies all appearances that give rise to impulse).
Hulê (ὕλη): matter, material. This is a very common reference in Epictetus, appearing more than
forty times, usually with the analogy of the material that craftspeople use as a way of talking about
where our own focus should be, and where the evidence of our progress will be seen in the art of
living (Discourses 1.15.2). He calls external things the raw material of our prohairesis (1.29.1–4a);
elsewhere he says, “The raw material for the work of a good and excellent person is their own
guiding reason (hêgemonikon)” (3.3.1). The term appears nineteen times in Marcus; see especially
8.35, where he talks about how we can “convert any obstacle into the raw material for our own
purpose.” Sometimes used interchangeably with ousia.
Hypolêpsis (ὑπόληψις): literally “taking up” an opinion, assumption, conception, notion,
understanding. Hadot translates the term as “value judgment” and sees a movement upward into
higher-level value judgments, from prolêpsis to hypolêpsis to katalêpsis. See Marcus 4.3.4b and 9.13,
where he talks about how our own assumptions can crush us, so we must throw them out. He also
says that “everything turns on our assumptions” (12.22), and we should hold our power for
understanding, or forming opinions, sacred (3.9). The term appears eight times in Epictetus’s
Discourses (see 2.19.13–14, where he says we hold opinions the opposite of what we should) and
three times in the Enchiridion (see 20 , where he talks about how our own opinions or assumptions
are what fuel anger).
Kalos (καλός): beautiful; in the moral sense, noble, virtuous. Seneca’s equivalent term, used quite
frequently, is honestum.
Katalêpsis (κατάληψις): true comprehension, clear perception, and firm conviction needed for
right conduct. Hadot translates the term as “perception” or “objective representation.” This is a
prominent term for Epictetus and stands in contrast to the Skeptic’s notion that nothing could be
known with certainty (ἀκατάληπτος). Epictetus says that true progress (prokopê) is about giving
assent (see synkatathesis) only where there is katalêpsis (Discourses 3.8.4). Marcus uses the term in
praising the character of Antoninus and his zeal for “getting a true grasp of affairs” (6.30.2), as well