The 48 Laws Of Power

(Utkarsh JhaWsTmab) #1
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LAW3!")

His

speech

indefenseofFalawasoneofthemost

popular

heever
gave.

In

this
case,
theweak
party

involvedwasthe

president’s

dog

andtheattack

backfired-inthe

longrun,

it

only

madethe

president

more

sympathetic,

since

manypeople

will

naturally

sidewiththe

“underdog,”just

asthe

American

public

cameto

sympathize

with
the
wily

but
outnumbered
Pan-

choVilla.

Itis
tempting

towanttofixour

mistakes,

buttheharderwe
try,

the

worseweoftenmakethem.Itissometimesmore
politic

toleavethem

alone.
In
1971,

whentheNewYbrklimes

published

the

PentagonPapers,

a

group

of
government

documentsaboutthe

history

ofUS.involvementin

Indochina,HenryKissinger

erupted

intoavolcanic
rage.

Furiousaboutthe

Nixon administi-ation’s

vulnerability

tothiskindof

damaging

leak,

he

maderecommendations
that

eventually

ledtothe
formation
ofa
group

called
thePlumbersto

plug

theleaks.Thiswastheunitthatlaterbrokeinto

Democratic

Party

officesinthe

Watergate

Hotel,

setting

offthechainof

eventsthatledtoNixon’sdownfall.In

reality

the

publication

ofthePenta-

gonPapers

wasnotaseriousthreattothe
administration,
but

Kissingefs

reaction
madeita

big

deal.In
trying

tofixone

problem,

hecreatedan-

other:a

paranoia

for

security

thatinthe
endwasmuch
moredestructiveto

the
government.

Had
he

ignored

the

PentagonPapers,

thescandal

they

hadcreatedwould

eventually

haveblownover.

Insteadof

inadvertentlyfocusing

attentionona

problem,making

it

seem
worse

bypublicizing

howmuchconcernand
anxiety

itis

causing

you,

it
is
ofien
farwiser
to

play

the
contemptuous
aristocrat,
not

deigning

to

acknowledge

the

problem’s

existence.Thereareseveral
ways

toexecute

this
strategy.

Firstthereisthe

sour-grapesapproach.

Ifthereis

somethingyou

want

butthat
you

realize
you

cannot

have,

theworst

thingyou

candoisdrawat-

tention to

yourdisappointmentbycomplaining

aboutit. An

infinitely

more

powerful

tacticistoactasifitnever

really

interested
you

inthefirst

place.

Whenthewriter

George

Sand’s
supporters

nominatedhertobethe

firstfemalememberoftheAcadémie

Frangaise,

in
1861,
Sand

quickly

saw

thatthe

academy

wouldneveradmither.Insteadof

whining,though,

she

claimedshehadnointerestin

belonging

tothis
group

of
worn—out,

over-

rated,
outAof—touch

windbags.

Herdisdain
was
the

perfectresponse:

Had

sheshownher
anger

ather

exclusion,

shewouldhaverevealedhowmuch

itmeanttoher.Instead
she
brandedthe

academy

aclubofoldmem-and

why

shouldshebe
angry

or

disappointed

atnot

having

to

spend

hertime

withthem?

Crying

“sour

grapes”

is
sometimes
seenasa
reflection
ofthe

weak;
itis

actually

thetacticofthe

powerful.

Second,

when
you

areattacked

by

an
inferior,
deflect

people’s

atten-

tion

bymaking

itclearthattheattackhasnoteven

registered.

Look
away,

oranswer

sweetly,showing

howlittletheattackconcerns
you.

Similarly,

when

youyourself

havecommitteda
blunder,

thebest
response

isoftento

makelessof
your

mistake

bytreating

it
lightly

The

Japanese

emperorGo-Saiin,

a

greatdisciple

ofthetea
ceremony,
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