The 48 Laws Of Power

Om’sedzwlivr?andulttl

mutelyulwu_V.\‘frlllli

path

hasbeenthe

dewelopmemof

]W()f(’f.'<

Iivcarmor.An

organ-

i.\‘r2rcan
protectitselfby

crmcenlmem,by

.y'wif1-

Hers

mflighl,bye/[E10

rivecoamwrartuck,

by

unitingfor

mlarkand

defense
withotherindi-

vizfltaix

uf

ils

species

andalso

byencasing

itself

within

bonyplates

and

spines.

...Almost

always

the

experiment

ofarmorfuiled.

Crew

rurev
adopting
ittended

to

become

unwieldy,

They

had 10 moverela-

live!

)1slowly.

Hence

they

were

forced

tolive

mairtly

on

vcgemble

food;

andthusin

genera!they

wereatif

dzimrivanrage

as

compared

with

foes

:'i1=ir:g

on

more

rapidly

“profitable

"

animal

food:

The

repeatedfaii«

ure

r)/‘pro(ecIi1«'e

armor

show:

that,

evenat(1

somewhazlowevolw

Iionurylevel.

mind

iriumphed

overmore

mamrr.ItLrthis.\‘(V!

of

Irhtmph

wlzrrizhas

him:

.ruprr°meI_V

Ilxrrrr

plified

inMan.

S(‘lF,NTlll(‘'1HEORY

1\l\'l)

RIIHUIUN.

E.W.

B,»‘\RNl-.3.

1933

422
l
LAW 43

byinfiltrating

the

Spartansystem

and

corroding

its

protective

armor.Inthe

battlebetweenthetwo

systems,

Athenswasfluidandcreative

enough

to

takenew

forms,

while

Sparta

could

growonly

more

rigid

untilitcracked.

Thisisthe

way

theworld

works,

whetherfor

animals,cultures,

orindi-

viduals.Inthefaceoftheworld’sharshnessand

danger,organisms

of

any

kind

developprotection-—a

coatof

armor,

a

rigidsystem,

a

comforting

rit-

ual.Fortheshorttermit

may

work,

butforthe

long

termit

spells

disaster.

Peopleweighed

down

by

a

system

andinflexible

ways

of

doingthings

can

notmove

fast,

cannotsenseor

adapt

to

change.They

lumberaround

more

andmore

slowly

until

theygo

the

way

of

the

brontosaurus.Learn

to

move

fast

and

adaptoryou

willbeeaten.

Thebest

way

toavoidthisfateistoassumeformlessness.No

predator

alivecanattackwhatitcannotsee.

OBSERVANCEOFTHELAW

WhenWorldV\7arIIendedandthe

Japanese,

whohadinvadedChina

in

1937,

had

finally

been

thrown

out,

theChinese

Nationalists,

lead

by

Chiang

Kai-shek,

decidedthetimehadcometoannihilatetheChinese

Communists,

theirhated

rivals,

onceandforall.

They

hadalmostsuc-

ceededin

1935,

forcing

theCommunistsintothe

Long

March,

the

grueling

retreatthathad

greatly

diminishedtheirnumbers.

Although

theCommu«

nists

hadrecoveredsomewhat

during

thewar

against

japan,

itwouldnot

bedifficulttodefeatthemnow.

They

controlled

only

isolatedareasinthe

countryside,

had

unsophisticatedweaponry,

lacked

anymilitaryexperi-

enceor

trainingbeyond

mountain

fighting,

andcontrolledno

important

parts

of

China,

except

areasof

Manchutia,

which

they

had

managed

totake

afterthe

Japanese

retreat.

Chiang

decidedtocommithisbestforcesin

Manclmria.Hewouldtakeoverits

major

citiesandfromthosebaseswould

spreadthrough

thisnorthernindustrial

region,sweeping

theCommunists

away.

OnceManchuriahad

fallen

the

Communistswould

collapse.

In 1945 and’46the

plan

worked

perfectly:

TheNationalists

easily

tookthe

major

Manchuriancities.

Puzzlingly,though,

inthefaceofthis

critical

campaign,

theCommunist

strategy

madenosense.WhentheNa-

tionalists

began

their

push,

the

Communists

dispersed

toManchuria’smost

out-of—the-way

corners.TheirsmallunitsharassedtheNationalist

armies,

ambushing

them

here,

retreatingunexpectedly

there,

butthese

dispersed

unitsneverlinked

up,making

themhardtoattack.

They

wouldseizea

town

only

to

give

it

up

afewweekslater.

Forming

neither

rear

guards

I101’

vanguards,they

moved

like

mercury,

never

staying

inone

place,

elusive

andformless.

TheNationalistsascribedthistotwo

things:

cowardiceinthe face

of

superior

forcesand

inexperience

in

strategy.

Mao

Tse~tung,

theCom»

munjst

leader,

wasmorea

poet

and

philosopher

thana

general,

whereas

Chiang

had

studied

warfare

intheWestand

was

afolloweroftheGerman

military

writerCarlVon

Clausewitz,

among

others.