Dictionary of Philosophy of Religion

(Amelia) #1
MERCY

149

Confucian philosopher of the classical
age. His teachings developed two themes
found in the Analects of Confucius: the
goodness of human nature and the ruler’s
obligation to behave morally toward his
subjects. In contrast to the Legalist school
of thought emerging at the time, which
held that human beings are basically
amoral and motivated by self-interest,
Mencius argued that everyone is born
with a natural propensity toward good-
ness. This natural inclination, however,
must be cultivated through education and
example. The purpose of government
is to ensure the welfare of the people.
The ruler, whose authority is ultimately
derived from the moral mandate of
Heaven, can lose his legitimacy through
misrule. The people, acting as agents of
Heaven, then have the right to overthrow
the evil ruler. The teachings of Mencius,
compiled in the Book of Mencius (Mengzi),
became part of the Confucian canon that
formed the basis of the imperial civil ser-
vice examination system until 1905.


MENDELSSOHN, MOSES (1729–
1786). A Jewish philosopher of the
German Enlightenment and disciple of
Leibniz and Wolff. His work focused on
proofs of and for the existence of God.
He argues that his own Judaism was not
a “revealed religion,” but a “revealed legis-
lation,” and so religion was not based on
the following of certain doctrinal beliefs,
but the following of certain actions.
This characterization of religion allowed


Mendelssohn to reconcile his faith with
his own political liberalism. His works
include Philosophical Writings (1761)
and Morning Hours, or Lectures on the
Existence of God (1785).

MERCY. Mercy involves unmerited or
undeserved favor, typically in the context
of justice. So one may have mercy on
someone who is in trouble when one is
not obligated to go to her assistance,
and one may have mercy on a criminal
when a lesser punishment is imposed
or the criminal is pardoned altogether.
Philosophers have disputed the relation-
ship of mercy and justice. Does mercy
need to be consistent (that is, if you have
mercy on one criminal are you then
obliged to have mercy on a criminal in
similar conditions)? Can mercy be good
when it is in conflict with justice? Imag-
ine a criminal genuinely deserves a harsh
punishment in the context of retributive
justice, but a magistrate thinks (rightly)
that pardoning the criminal will bring
about great good (e.g., the criminal has
repented and will aid in fighting crime).
In that case, could it be good that the
magistrate does something that is wrong
from the standpoint of retributive justice?
In theology, some theologians hold that
from the standpoint of justice, an all
good God would destroy the wicked, but
from the standpoint of mercy, God may
and has elected to redeem the wicked.
Does this involve God doing something
that (from the standpoint of retributive
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