The Economist - USA (2020-03-28)

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The EconomistMarch 28th 2020 Special reportThe African century 7

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The forever wars


Some parts of Africa could be violent and unstable for decades to come

O


n the edgeof a shallow ravine in the
far western corner of Burkina Faso
two vehicles bristling with machine guns
come to a stop. Several bearded white
men lean out, keeping watch for jihad-
ists. Nearby, other Western soldiers are
helping their African counterparts stage
a mock attack on an insurgent base.
These are some of the special forces
from a number of Western countries who
have been fighting jihadists in the Sahel
for years. Many Western army and in-
telligence officials see extremists in the
region posing a greater danger than the
remnants of Islamic State in Syria and
Iraq. America has sent about 6,000
troops to Africa, France 5,100 and Ger-
many 1,100. There are almost as many
Western troops in Africa as those fighting
the Taliban and Islamic State.
Yet most foreign leaders are keeping
quiet about it, worried that they will get
little public support at home. President
Donald Trump has reduced America’s
troops in Africa by about 10%, against the
wishes of his generals, and is considering
a much deeper cut.

That is worrying because the jihadists
are getting the upper hand. Last year more
than 10,000 people lost their lives in vio-
lence related to Islamist groups in Africa.
Mali, whose capital almost fell to jihadists
in 2012 before French forces stepped in, is
at the centre of the turmoil. Much of the
countryside in its vast north has fallen,
despite a unpeacekeeping force that is
15,000 strong. Now the extremists are
spilling out into neighbouring countries.
Burkina Faso, which was stable a few years
ago, has lost control of the triangle of
territory in its north, which borders Niger
and Mali.
Western security officials had hoped it
could act as a bulwark to stop the insur-
gents crossing over and destabilising
coastal states such as Ghana and Benin.
Now they are drawing new lines of de-
fence. François Lecointre, chief of staff of
the French armed forces, has said his
troops will be in the Sahel “for the next 30
years”. Brigadier-General Dagvin An-
derson, who commands American special
forces in Africa expects “a generational,
multinational effort”.

Stopping the jihadists will require not
just troops, but also schools, economic
development and accountable govern-
ments. Countries in the Sahel are not
helped by climate and topography. Their
people are poorer, less educated and have
stubbornly high fertility rates. Just as
countries such as Kenya and Ethiopia are
slowing their population growth, women
in countries such as Niger continue to
have more than seven children each. The
region’s rapidly deteriorating security is a
warning to the continent as a whole of
what may happen if its growing numbers
of young people are not educated or are
unable to find jobs at home or abroad.
The Islamist jihad has caused more
than 1,000 schools to close across west
Africa, leaving almost 2m children out of
school. In one village of 6,000 people
outside the city of Maiduguri in north-
eastern Nigeria, near the border with
Niger, the only education that the village’s
2,000 children get is learning to recite the
Koran. There is not a book in sight, just the
rhythmic chanting of children rising into
the afternoon heat.

Oromo activists in America played a key role in the protests that
have pushed Ethiopia in a more democratic direction.
It is not just politics that is being transformed but also busi-
ness. Some returnees are actual rocket scientists such as Kwami
Williams, a Ghanaian-born American who studied aerospace engi-
neering at mitand was about to take a job at nasabefore he
changed course and set up a business in Ghana. Or Ikenna Nzewi, a
Nigerian-American who studied computer science at Yale before
teaming up with two pals from mitand Duke to set up a business,
Releaf, to collect and process palm-oil kernels from smallholder
farmers in Nigeria. Rather than migration leading to a “brain
drain” or “brain gain”, it is actually circular, with people moving,
learning new skills and then moving again, says Stephen Gelb of
the Overseas Development Institute (odi), a London think-tank.
The second big wave of migration is people moving within Afri-
ca. More than half of African migrants stay on the continent, most
of them travelling along well-established migratory routes such as
one that links Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast. There, about 10% of
the population are migrants yet they generate close to 20% of its
gdp. Migration boosts productivity in many other places. A study
by the oecdfound that because foreigners working in South Africa
brought skills that were missing from the labour market, they did
not take jobs from locals. Instead they helped boost employment
and wages of South African-born workers, bumping up income per
person by as much as 5%.
Countries that send migrants elsewhere in Africa also see many
benefits through trade and investment. Lots of people like to eat
the food they grew up with, so many end up importing it after they
have moved elsewhere, an effect big enough to stand out in trade

statistics compiled by unctad. This is also true when they move to
the rich world. They are creating a cultural melting-pot of music
and film, too. “African youth culture is going to have a fundamen-
tal influence on global youth culture,” argues Cobus Van Staden at
Wits University. It is exportable because it is open and “deeply in
conversation” across cultures, he says, citing as an example how
musicians from different African countries collaborate.
The third great migration is the shifting of people from the
countryside to cities. Africa’s population is still largely rural, with
just 41% living in cities. But this is changing fast. The number of

1987 2015

Autocracy

Closed
anocracy

Open
anocracy Democracy
Colony No data

Sources: Wimmer and Min (2006); Centre for Systemic Peace

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