xiv Introduction
formation in the broadest and most comprehensive sense, is more important
than anything else in deciding the character of a particular polıteía.^11 In one
passage of The Politics, Aristotle suggests that it is the provision of a common
paıdeía—and nothing else—that turns a multitude into a unit and constitutes
it as a pólıs; in another, he indicates that it is the polıteía which defines the pólıs
as such. Though apparently in contradiction, these two statements are in fact
equivalent—for, as the peripatetic recognized, man is an imitative animal, the
example we set is far more influential than what we say, and it is the “distribu-
tion and disposition of offices and honors [táxıs tōˆn archōˆn]” constituting the
políteuma of a given polity that is the most effective educator therein.^12 It is not
fortuitous that Polybius’ celebrated discussion of the Roman polıteía is, in
fact, a discussion of the paıdeía accorded its ruling order. Precisely the same
observation can be made regarding Xenophon’s account of the Persian polıteía.^13
Plato, Aristotle, Xenophon, Polybius, and those who came after were all per-
suaded of one thing: that if certain opinions reign and come to be authorita-
tive within a given political community, it is because their advocates have
consolidated dominion there and, in the process, have managed to persuade
themselves and their subjects of their right to rule by an appeal to their own
preeminence in honoring these same opinions in speech and in deed.^14
In short, from the perspective of these ancient authors, the modern dis-
tinction between materialism and idealism makes little practical, political
sense—for what really matters most with regard to political understanding is
this: to decide who is to rule or what sorts of human beings are to share in rule
and function as a community’s políteuma is to determine which of the various
and competing titles to rule is to be authoritative; in turn, this is to decide
what qualities are to be admired and honored in the city, what is to be con-
sidered advantageous and just, and how happiness and success [eudaımonía]
are to be understood and pursued; and this decision—more than any other—
determines the paıdeía which constitutes “the one way of life of a whole pólıs.”^15
This decision may be a matter of chance, to be sure. As even Alexander
Hamilton was forced to concede, few, if any, “societies of men” have ever es-
tablished “good government from reflection and choice”; most, if not all, have
been “destined to depend, for their political constitutions, on accident and
f o r c e .”^16 But where circumstance predominates—as, the ancients fully recog-
nized, is usually the case—it is either because the citizens have been over-
whelmed by the sheer momentum of events or because they have managed