Conclusion 123
themselves someday come a cropper. And so the Spartiates reluctantly aban-
doned the dream of further expansion, repositioned themselves as defenders
of Arcadian autonomy, and presented themselves to the Hellenic world as the
scourge of tyranny, the champions of liberty, the friends of oligarchy, and the
heirs of Agamemnon. It was under this banner that they rearranged the affairs
of their fellow Peloponnesians to their liking and founded a grand alliance de-
signed to keep their Argive enemies out, the helots down, and the Arcadians,
above all others, in.
Taken as a whole, the grand strategy of classical Lacedaemon was bril-
liantly designed for the purpose it was intended to serve. It had, however, one
grave defect. It presupposed that for all practical purposes, under Sparta’s he-
gemony, the Peloponnesus was a world unto itself—which, of course, it was
... at the time that this strategy was first formulated.^6 If, however, there ever
came a moment when a power equal to or greater than Lacedaemon appeared
in force—or even threatened to appear—at or near the entrance to that great
peninsula, the Spartans would have to rethink this strategy and recast it to
meet an unanticipated challenge.
It was in or quite soon after the mid-540s that such a prospect first loomed
in the distance on the horizon. As we shall see in the sequel to this volume,
although the Spartans were by no means slow to take note of the challenge
they faced, they were exceedingly cautious in the mode of proceeding that
they then adopted.