xi

I

n the summer of 425 b.c., the Athenians managed to pull off a coup. They

were at war. They had established a base on the western coast of the Pelo-

ponnesus at Navarino Bay for the purpose of harassing the foe. Their op-

ponents controlled the mainland; and, in the course of attempting to drive the

Athenians from this base, they had landed a small force of heavy infantry,

roughly four hundred twenty in number, on the island of Sphacteria—which

lay across the entrance to the bay. Although they were far from home and at a

distinct disadvantage, the Athenians had then responded by leveraging their

strength at sea in such a manner as to isolate the enemy infantrymen and trap

them on the island; and, after a time, they attacked this small band with a

superior force including light-armed troops and archers far better suited to

the island’s rugged terrain than the hoplites deployed by their foe. The enemy

band they surrounded. Its members they pelted with arrows and stones. Then,

they persuaded those who had survived the initial onslaught to give them-

selves up.^1

Ordinarily, such a development would not be especially newsworthy. In

time of war, some operations succeed, others fail, and small groups of men

frequently get cornered and find themselves compelled to surrender. But this

particular event, though at first glance it might seem a mere skirmish of minor

importance, was different. There was something about it that made the Athe-

nian victory a genuinely memorable achievement of real strategic importance,

well worth recording and later recalling to mind and pondering.

Styphon son of Pharax, the man on whom command of the force that

found itself isolated on Sphacteria had devolved, was no ordinary man. The

Introduction

The Allure of Lacedaemon