Warring Societies of Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia_ Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context

Warring Societies of Pre-colonial Southeast Asia

to the lack in Vietnamese sources, abundant Chinese references to piracy
and their alliance with the rebels have overwhelmed other approaches
to the subject.^9 Meanwhile, little attention is dedicated to Nguyen Phuc
Anh’s naval warfare,^10 which constitutes a third problematic approach.
Vietnamese scholars underestimate his naval performance because of
Nguyen Phuc Anh’s rivalry with the Tayson, and the nationalist pre-
sumption that he, as a “feudal warlord”, was unable to earn any local sup-
port. Western scholars, meanwhile, have long underlined the western
origins of technology behind early modern Vietnam’s naval advances.^11
This chapter argues otherwise. It shows the peculiar importance of
naval warfare in late eighteenth century Vietnam by focusing on coastal
and riverine operations conducted by the Tayson and Nguyen Phuc
Anh. Pierre-Yves Manguin has argued for the shift of shipbuilding tech-
nology and vessel use in early modern Southeast Asian waters related

Coasts in Asia: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives (Singapore: ISEAS, 2010);

Robert J. Antony, Like Froth Floating on the Sea: the World of Pirates and Seafarers

in Late Imperial South China (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2003);

Idem, “Maritime Violence and State Formation in Vietnam: Piracy and the Tay Son

Rebellion, 1771–1802”, in Stefan Amirell and Leos Muller, (eds), Persistent Piracy:

Maritime Violence and State-Formation in Global Historical Perspective (Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan, 2014): 113–30. Recent research by Charles Wheeler draws in-

sights from maritime subversions and political formation in Vietnamese history, but

mostly concentrates on “piracy and smuggling in the South China Sea”. See Charles

Wheeler, “Maritime Subversions and Socio-political Formations in Vietnamese

History: A Look From the Marginal Center (Mien Trung)”, in Michael Aung-

Thwin & Kenneth R. Hall (eds), New Perspectives on the History and Historiography

of Southeast Asia (London: Routledge, 2011): 141–56.

9. For example, Antony suggests that the “aid from the pirates helped to sustain the
   Tayson regime and allowed it to remain in power until its final defeat in 1802”,
   George Dutton argues that pirates “became a central feature of Tayson naval
   strategy and indeed the regime’s economy between 1786 and 1802”. Additionally,
   Dian Murray claims, “Chinese pirates participated in every major Tayson-naval
   encounter.” See Antony, “Maritime Violence and State-Formation”, 113; George
   Dutton, The Tayson, 219; Dian Murray, Pirates, 37.


10. Until very recently, only a few scholars interested in southwestern Indochina have
    mentioned Nguyen Phuc Anh. Geoff Wade, “A Coastal Route from the Lower
    Mekong Delta to Terengganu”, in Cooke & Li (eds), Water Frontiers, 178–86; Li,
    “Ship and Shipbuilding in the Mekong Delta, c. 1750–1840”, in Water Frontier,
    119–33.


11. This is based on part of the observations of US Naval lieutenant John White who
    journeyed to Cochinchina in 1819 and offered a great deal of admiration regarding
    how skillful the Vietnamese were to adopt western naval technology. See John
    White, A Voyage to Cochin China (London: Longman et al, 1824): 265.