Warring Societies of Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia_ Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context

(Dana P.) #1
The Age of the Sea Falcons

Le-Trinh navy was completely unaware of the attack until Tayson vessels
approached the estuaries that led to Hanoi. In response, they dispatched
fleets to take positions on the Luoc River and prepare for a pitched bat-
tle. Lining up horizontally with the enemy fleet, the Le-Trinh warships
opened fire first. The shells, however, did no harm to their opponents.
When the Tayson fired their own cannon, their shells exploded like
“lightning-bolt[s] splitting an old tree into two parts”.^72 The Le-Trinh
navy was severely intimidated and fled from the battle in disarray. It is
clear that the Tayson’s advanced weaponry and combat skills offered
them a clear military advantage over both Nguyen Cochinchina and the
Trinh.
However, the geographically expanding Tayson control over Vietnam
provided their navy with more challenges than advantages. Besides Thi
Nai, they had no naval strongholds. In addition, their fleets were at no
point a unified military organization, but instead merely a temporary
gathering of varied fighting groups, many motivated solely by economic
interests. This lack of military prowess made them vulnerable and inef-
fective in the long-term. These weaknesses were gradually revealed and
exploited by Nguyen Phuc Anh. First, the geographic realm of naval
operations expanded so dramatically that it was impractical for the
Tayson to maintain effective control. Second, the cooperation between
different naval groups frequently waxed and waned during the Qing
Emperor Jiaqing’s massive campaigns to suppress piracy in southeast
China. A third weakness of the Tayson related to their naval organiza-
tion, particularly the frail connection between the navy, the infantry, and
war elephant forces.
Clearly aware of his enemy’s desultory war machine and logistical
problems, Nguyen Phuc Anh pursued a unique strategy that deployed his
fleets with exceptional efficacy: the campagnes de saison (1792–1799).
The long, narrow central coast could be divided and controlled from
the sea. His approach was simple. He employed the gap between the
Tayson navy and infantry and isolated important cities such as Phu Yen,
Quy Nhon, and Hue from northern supply lines. When his navy could
maintain a considerable flow of provisions from Gia Dinh, he started
seizing fortresses (such as Dien Khanh in present-day Khanh Hoa)
and turned them into powerful military outposts. Close collaboration



  1. HLNTC, 84–85.

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