Warring Societies of Pre-Colonial Southeast Asia_ Local Cultures of Conflict Within a Regional Context

(Dana P.) #1
The Age of the Sea Falcons

planned to include 300,000 troops.^76 However, the military mastermind
abruptly died in the same year, leaving behind the promised campaign
and an unfinished legacy
In the second campaign in 1793, Gia Dinh’s fleets besieged a num-
ber of the Tayson’s coastal citadels by expanding their naval and land
operations. The result was the establishment of several well-defended
outposts in Binh Khang, Binh Thuan, and Dien Khanh.^77 Located 200
kilometers south of Thi Nai, Dien Khanh (in present-day Khanh Hoa)
became Nguyen’s most strategically important northern garrison. The
citadel could be assisted by a naval fleet on the Cu Huan estuary and
became the departure point to launch coastal assaults from Quy Nhon
to Hue. In an effort to recapture this stronghold, 40,000 Tayson infantry
and crewmen besieged the fort in early 1794. In the summer, Nguyen
naval forces that also set sail to destroy Thi Nai for the second time
repulsed them.
Strongly convinced that if the coast was controlled, the “Tayson in-
fantry would do no harm”,^78 Nguyen Phuc Anh had a clear vision of how
to maximize his naval power. From 1795, his fleets gradually dominated
the coastal waters, and he was able to launch attacks from both land
and sea to repulse Tayson ground forces. These coastal operations also
disrupted Tayson logistical chains and left them no choice but to depend
heavily upon overland transportation across difficult terrain. In 1799, the
Nguyen army started attacking the Tayson heartland, especially near Quy
Nhon, clearing many coastal garrisons and supply bases. After a decade
of seasonal expeditions, Gia Dinh’s navy had dramatically improved with
not only large quantities of innovative warships and artillery, but also ex-
perienced crews and advanced combat skills. Expanding and solidifying
the ship-deck could transport more men and cannon. They also adapted
western training, including a system of naval tactics and signals that al-
lowed better communication.^79 These improvements gave the Nguyen
a decisive advantage. There emerged a profound relationship between



  1. Dang Phuong Nghi, “Trieu dai Quang Trung duoi con mat cac nha truyen giao Tay
    phuong” [The Tayson Dynasty in the Eyes of Western Missionaries] Su Dia 13
    (1969): 171–72, 176.

  2. DNTL, vol. 2, quyen 6, 101.

  3. DNTL, vol. 2, quyen 7, 114.

  4. Barrow, A Voyage to Cochinchina: 274.

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