Warring Societies of Pre-colonial Southeast Asiageographical terrain, topographical knowledge, and the human conduct
of warfare. Not surprisingly, the major theater of Nguyen naval opera-
tion was the water world of central and southern Vietnam. Nguyen Phuc
Anh who had spent three decades in this amphibious environment had a
mastery of geographical knowledge that was now turned into an ultimate
military advantage.
Towards the end of the 1790s, the Qing’s increasing suppression
of piracy threatened the partnership between the Tayson and Chinese
pirates. This had an immediate impact on the dramatic decline of the
Tayson fleets and crews and weakened the Tayson’s naval resources.^80
Subsequently, they had to rely significantly on infantry and war ele-
phants, and almost abandoned the seas. Nguyen Phuc Anh was prepared
to dominate the coastal areas. He could now mobilize the whole army
on boats, sailing north to engage with large-scale battles. In the 1796
campaign alone, the Prince had 600 warships transport 40,000 troops
over 1,000 kilometers.^81 The Tayson’s leaders, who were now living un-
der a Damoclesian sword, tried hard to reorganize their military system
but it was not enough to turn the tide in their favor. To make their situ-
ation worse, Nguyen warships stationed on gulfs, estuaries, and rivers
broke their enemy’s defense system. In 1796, the central coastline was in
hands of five Nguyen fleets. They broke through the Tayson’s defensive
lines and provided logistical help and reinforcements. The Tayson who
controlled areas from Phu Yen to Quang Binh were detached from the
north. Since the region was not well suited for rice production,^82 the
longer the war went on, the more desperate the besieged became. In
1800, their last attempts to supply Quy Nhon by sea were defeated,
resulting in the capture of 150 transporting ships filled with grain, arms
and gunpowder.^83 The Tayson’s days were numbered.
The performance of Nguyen navy signified a change in the course
of military history in early modern Vietnam. Naval power created a
new warfare structure and tactics of land–sea communication that
increased the scale and speed of operations. On that observation, the
present discussion will end with the biggest and most decisive battle of
- Murray, Pirates of the South China Coast: 42.
- Pham Van Son, Viet Su Tan Bien, Vol. 4, 213.
- Phu Lang, “Cuoc khoi day va chien tranh cua Tay son”: 57.
- DNTL, vol. 2, quyen 12, 209.