9 J.H.Mulherinand A. B.Poulsen, “ProxyContests and
Corporate Change: Implications for Shareholder Wealth,”
Journal of FinancialEconomics 47 (1998): 279–313. They
find thatthebulkofthewealth fromproxycontestsstems
from firms that are subsequently acquired or where
management is changed.
10 R. Parrino,R. W.Sias, andL. T. Starks,“Votingwith
TheirFeet:InstitutionalOwnershipChanges aroundForced
CEOTurnover,”JournalofFinancialEconomics 69 (2003):
3–46.Theyfindthataggregateinstitutionalownershipdrops
byabout 12 percentintheyearpriortoaforcedCEOchange
and that individual ownership increases. Institutional
investorswhoarebetterinformedandmoreconcernedabout
prudence are more likely to sell during this period.
11 In 2001, for example, Hewlett-Packard announced its
intent to acquire Compaq. Two of Hewlett-Packard’s
directors,includingDavidHewlett,resigned,arguingthatthe
acquisitiondid not makesense. However,Ms. Fiorina,the
CEO of Hewlett-Packard, was able to convince enough
institutional investors to stick with her on the final vote.
12 Intwo-tiertenderoffers,acquirersofferahigherpricefor
thefirst 51 percentofthesharestenderedandalowerprice
for the remaining 49 percent. By doing so, they hope to
increase the number of stockholders who do tender.
13 S.LinnandJ.J.McConnell,“AnEmpiricalInvestigation
of theImpact of Anti-TakeoverAmendments on Common
Stock Prices,” Journal of Financial Economics 11 (1983):
361–399.