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(Ann)
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the animals to the Dörbed. Finally, within a few months some of these
same Khorchin would likewise need aid in the wake of a drought that
ruined their ownfields.^43
If anthropogenic disaster, from excessive land clearance or failures in
water control, was common in China proper, natural calamities from
extreme weather were the norm on the steppe. This difference not only made
steppe disaster more difficult to avoid but also made relief efforts more
complicated. Rugged terrain, comparatively undeveloped communications
infrastructure, and sheer distance from administrative centers often pre-
cluded exact compliance with China proper statues that, for example, man-
dated food aid during“the most difficult [i.e., winter] months of the year.”^44
Ecological conditions on both sides of the wall compelled the state to
abandon some of its management principles in practice. Even in the lower
Yangzi core, harsh winter weather could hamper or preclude marketized
relief solutions, such as grants of silver for food purchases, by blocking
vital transport arteries. Differences nevertheless persisted. Although it
tried to monitor and limit local Han gentry’s vital, but potentially exploit-
ative, participation in relief, the state actually obliged the steppe’s local
elites, thehoshuubannerjasag, to afford relief directly.^45
Although I have found no literal statement to this effect, regulations and
reports concerning Mongolian disaster relief strongly imply that local elite
participation was essential because there was no other ready source of relief
livestock. The relevant regulation required the elites of a stricken banner“to
establish means for aid.”If insufficient, their aid would be augmented by
similar donations “of cattle and sheep” from sources throughout the
banner’s league. Only after several years of dearth would theLifanyuan
intervene, funded, however, through deductions from the salaries of the
jasagofficials concerned.^46 Overall, it is clear that the nature of the disaster
is assumed to affect livestock, and elites are directly responsible for its
replacement. The state merely contributes loans for timely animal purchase.
In fact, in the few cases on record that have come to light where the state did
contemplate providing livestock directly, as it did in the 1733 case, local
elites held all head on the behalf of the dynasty. These animals had been
assessed from various Mongol offenders asfines of penalty livestock.^47
The state was also reluctant in certain instances even to provide grain,
if the Kangxi emperor’s petulant response to a 1716 request for grain aid
to distressed Ordos Mongols is any guide. The emperor remonstrated in
vermillion ink that in the season for military operations, which required
grain, such requests were inappropriate. Moreover,“in Ordos the rabbits
are quite numerous” and the region enjoyed an abundance of root
132 Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain
