ann
(Ann)
#1
Mianning, converted from a native chieftainship into part of Yunnan
proper in 1746 , had at least twenty strategic locales within its confines
that“government troops were unable to garrison”because of the dis-
ease. Within two months, Qing troops were withdrawn from the nearby
chieftainship zones as the seasonal“malaria beyond thejunxianbound-
ary (bianwai) became extreme.”^90 Patchy Mianning, at the southern
fringes of Yunnan proper but well inside its disease environment,
remained incompletely incorporated. Malarial conditions complicated
the defense of the subprefecture, whichcontinued to rely on locals for its
viability.
Malaria in the chieftainships also inhibited the projection of Qing
power beyond them. During the initial stages of the Myanmar campaigns
in 1766 , Yun-Gui Governor-General Liu Cao expressed reservations
about crossing the Mekong River during the malaria season. He described
his objective as“beyond the frontier of Pu’er,”in the restive Sipsong-
panna (Xi-shuang-ban-na) region of the Cheli chieftainship in the prefec-
ture’s southwestern corner. His worries earned him a rebuke from the
throne, which asserted that Liu was not very familiar with border condi-
tions if he thought the disease ubiquitously virulent. He was warned not
to use malaria as a pretext for inaction. Yet at least one contemporary
account of the campaign asserts that the Mekong’s branches in southern
Pu’er were ridden with malaria. Strategic passes such as that of Puteng
then had to be garrisoned with auxiliaries or seasonal deployments when
the malarial season subsided. Furthermore, routine Manchu reports from
1793 – 94 confirm that regular patrols of“tribal officers and troops”(Ma:
aiman i hafan cooha) through Pu’er’s Simao and Mekong (“Jiulong”)
river areas could be conducted only“at times when malaria (Ma:ehe
sukdun) subsides.”^91
A series of reports from 1766 – 67 makes it clear thatfighting in the
borderland’s disease environment with the assistance of indigenous auxil-
iaries“who could stand malaria”limited operations in Myanmar during
the malarial peak seasons in spring and summer. It also precluded gar-
risoning of strategic areas just across the border as well as along the
Mekong, here a prefectural boundary wholly within Qing territory
between Pu’er and Shunning. Disease deeply marked subsequent dynastic
policies, which frankly rejected military intervention in the face of bor-
derland malarial conditions.^92
The disease was certainly a major obstacle to the Qing advance. As the
campaign progressed and losses from illness mounted, central authorities
in Beijing adopted a more cautious tone. By the end of the campaign in
202 Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain
