Across Forest, Steppe, and Mountain_ Environment, Identity, and Empire in Qing China\'s Borderlands

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effective inner frontier zone:“Even the native chieftainships within the

frontier cannot be defended. How can the inhabitants of Yunnan

proper be protected?”^74

Hu obtained permission to establish a western line of seventy-seven

“strongpoints”(diaobao) manned by 624 chieftainship militia, backed up

in a few strategic places by Han relief forces that could be stationed on

nonmalarial high ground. The strongpoints were supposed to be self-

supporting military agricultural colonies similar to those employed

against the Miao in Hunan and against White Lotus sectarians in

Sichuan and elsewhere. At least nine of Hu’s blockhouses were con-

structed along the reaches of the Binlang River, some in explicitly malarial

areas, which would now form the province’s western extremity.^75

Contrary to some statements in local gazetteers, this system did not

function very effectively.^76 He Zikai, a contemporary of Hu, had opposed

the strongpoints because they could not possibly cover the numerous

passes connecting Yunnan proper with the border zones. During his

operations against wild tribals as governor-general of Yun-Gui, Lin

Zexu confirmed that invaders, who had taken twenty-six Han men and

women, could simply bypass the strongpoints. In 1849 these raiders,

“neither foreign subjects nor controlled by native chieftainships,”were

living“mixed together in mountain valleys in individual stockades that

appoint their own headmen.”There were still moving freely into Yunnan

from the Yerenshan.^77

The unrestricted movement of people through rugged, malarial ter-

rain hindered Qing ability to secure Yunnan’s southwestern frontier

zones in 1849 as it had done in 1769 .By 1899 disease environment

dynamics were reasserting themselves to undermine imperial indigen-

ism. A western observer at this time noted that“malaria is so prevalent”

infive of ten chieftainships in southern Pu’er prefecture’s Sipsongpanna

region“that the Chinese will not dwell in them.”Consequently, Chinese

officials could“exercise no more than a nominal control over those

districts. The actualmilitaryjurisdiction of the Chinese does not extend

more than a few miles to the west or south of Sumao [Simao].”

A Chinese official and some of his military escort had just died of the

disease a few years before in 1897 while mediating a succession dispute

in the Mengzhe chieftainship.^78

Routine patrol reports from the early 1790 s portray a much more

harmonious society in the Simao and Jiulong stretch of the Mekong River

region, with high-yield highland and lowland cultivation as well as mutu-

ally profitable commerce between Han settlers and indigenous peoples.^79

Borderland Hanspace in the Nineteenth Century 251
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