Mira Rapp-Hooper
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ing twenty-¥rst-century balance o power only in tandem with its
allies in Asia and Europe. Otherwise, it will be a feeble and lonely
competition, indeed.THE PRICE OF POWER
Both the Trump administration and notable international relations
scholars worry that the United States’ alliances lead to chronic free-
riding, allowing U.S. allies to bene¥t from American security guaran-
tees and military cooperation even though they add comparatively
little to the relationship. Nearly every U.S. president has wished that
the country’s allies would spend more on defense, and there is little
doubt that the United States has generally outspent most o its treaty
allies in Asia and Europe. The imbalance persists even today: the
United States spends over three percent o its ±½Ä on defense; the
next-highest spenders among the United States’ allies spend 2.5 per-
cent, and many others spend 1.5–2.0 percent. But these numbers are
deceptive. The United States, after all, maintains a global defense
posture, whereas its partners generally spend on security in their im-
mediate neighborhoods. What’s more, U.S. military spending in such
countries as Germany and Japan is largely devoted to a regional de-
fense strategy, as opposed to the defense o a single host ally. There is
no reason to expect those countries’ defense budgets to be comparable
to that o the United States.
U.S. allies also contribute to their alliances with the United States
in ways that aren’t captured by their defense expenditures—such as
by granting low-cost leases for U.S. bases and constructing facilities
for use by U.S. troops. Contrary to common perceptions, alliances
themselves cost nothing: it is the spending on deployments and in-
frastructure that results in high costs. And Washington’s allies often
assume part o the burden. Moreover, the price o the American alli-
ance system has, historically, been an acceptable portion o the U.S.
national budget. There is little evidence that alliance-related spend-
ing has forced other major tradeos or has been a drag on economic
growth. And the asymmetry between Washington’s spending and
that o its allies is a feature o the alliance system, not a bug: it gives
the United States more inuence over its partners, who depend on
American strength for their security.
There is also relatively little evidence that the United States’ al-
liances have imposed major political costs. International relations