Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press
44 «¬® ̄°±² ³««³°® ́
game to limit each side’s espionage and
covert actions against the other. I one
side determined that the other had gone
too far, it would retaliate, after which
things would go back to normal. There
is no reason why Washington and
Moscow could not manage the same
today. Nor would such an agreement
require much trust, which is clearly
lacking on both sides. Were Moscow to
continue its policy o domestic political
interference, Washington could initiate
programs to destabilize Russia’s own
domestic politics. Authoritarian regimes,
always afraid o rivals at home, are at
least as vulnerable to such outside
interference as democracies are. And i
the West reneges on its promises,
Moscow can retaliate by ramping up its
own information war.
Perhaps the biggest hurdle to achiev-
ing such an agreement—even an infor-
mal one—is the reluctance o U.S.
foreign policy leaders to acknowledge
that Russia has valid national security
interests in eastern Europe. But ignor-
ing Russia’s concerns will not make
them disappear. “It is totally unrealistic
to think that the West can gain desired
Russian restraint and cooperation,”
wrote the former U.S. diplomat Leslie
Gelb in 2015, “without dealing with
Moscow as a great power that possesses
real and legitimate interests.”A DEAL FOR CHINA
U.S. primacy has also come under
strain from a rising China. In 1990, the
country was a geopolitical afterthought:
its economy was only six percent o the
size o the U.S. economy; today, that
¥gure is 63 percent. (Considering
purchasing power parity adjustments to
±½Ä, China has already surpassed theand Europe continue to expand their
political and military inuence into
Russia’s near abroad. (Bosnia, Georgia,
North Macedonia, and Ukraine all are
queuing up for entry into ²³μ¬, for
example.) Russia, in turn, has launched
covert military interventions in
Ukraine, carried out dramatic assassina-
tion attempts in the United Kingdom,
and conducted political interference
campaigns across the West.
To de-escalate this conict, the two
sides should strike a bargain: Western
nonexpansion for Russian noninterfer-
ence. The West would cease any further
enlargement o ²³μ¬ and the ̄º in
eastern Europe. In return, Russia
would agree to cease its campaign o
domestic political interference. (The
degree o U.S. government interference
in Russia’s domestic politics is unclear,
but Washington would also need to
disavow such methods.)
Whatever the speci¥cs o the deal,
its goal would be mutual accommoda-
tion. Let the Russians come forth and
list whatever they see as the most
egregious Western encroachments on
their interests—perhaps it is indeed the
expansion o ²³μ¬ and the ̄º, perhaps
some other policy. Western govern-
ments can do the same, and the two
sides can negotiate with the goal o
removing the worst irritants. Such an
understanding, even i it leaves both
sides dissatis¥ed on the margins, would
oer a clear path forward.
Critics might object that such a deal
would be unenforceable given the
di¾culty, in an age o disinformation, o
proving who carried out what political
operation against whom. But during the
Cold War, the two sides managed this
problem and established rules o the