Jennifer Lind and Daryl G. Press
46 «¬® ̄°±² ³««³°® ́
United States can refrain from adding
new allies and military partners, in
particular along China’s borders. Estab-
lishing such relationships would ignore
Beijing’s concerns in the same way
Washington disregarded Moscow’s by
extending ²³μ¬ into the Baltics. And in
Asia, the United States would be poking
the eye o a rising, not a declining, power.
In exchange for these concessions,
Washington could require Beijing to
respect the status quo in Taiwan and in
other territorial disputes. Out o con-
cern for human rights and for geopolitical
reasons, the United States does not want
the Taiwan issue settled forcibly, nor does
it want the region’s several island or
border disputes to lead to violence that
could spiral into a wider war. I¤ Beijing
were to agree but later stray from its
commitments, Washington could use
force i appropriate (for example, to
defend its allies) or covertly intervene in
Chinese domestic politics, calibrating its
response based on the severity o
China’s transgressions.
China may well be open to a deal o
this kind. Chinese leaders routinely
emphasize the need to avoid conict
with the United States and say they
welcome a U.S. presence in the region,
so long as the United States does not
seek to contain China. Beijing also
understands that U.S. disengagement
would likely cause Japan to increase its
military power and adopt a more
assertive security policy—something
China would prefer to avoid.
Détente with Washington would be
the more prudent path for Beijing,
because its leaders face pressing domes-
tic problems, such as corruption, envi-
ronmental degradation, and an insu¾cient
social safety net. But China is a risingnomic pressure to punish countries that
it deems hostile to China, and built the
capabilities needed to challenge U.S.
military superiority in East Asia. In an
era in which U.S. political, economic,
and military dominance in the region has
declined, avoiding conict and cooperat-
ing with Beijing will require respect for
its core concerns. The two countries share
many interests, regionally and globally.
They both want a denuclearized North
Korea and stability on the Korean
Peninsula. The same goes for addressing
climate change, terrorism, nuclear
proliferation, and numerous other global
problems. Washington and Beijing can
make headway on such issues together, or
they can have a hostile relationship.
They cannot do both.
In a post-primacy era, U.S. leaders
should ask what they can realistically
achieve without poisoning U.S.-Chinese
relations. O course, the United States
wants China to democratize and respect
the human rights o its people. It also
wants to see the Taiwan question
resolved in a way that grants peace and
autonomy to that thriving democratic
society. But pushing for those goals
would directly challenge core interests
o the Chinese Communist Party.
Doing so would stymie bilateral coop-
eration, threaten the United States’
relationship with partners in the region
(who want to maintain stable relations
with China), and risk war.
A deal with Beijing would center on a
few central issues. One is the future o
American alliances in the region. The
United States’ relationships in East Asia
are an important source o U.S. political
and military power, so it would be unwise
for Washington to sacri¥ce them for a
rapprochement with China. But the