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THERE ARE TWO
KINDS OF TRUTHS:
TRUTHS OF
REASONING AND
TRUTHS OF FACT
GOTTFRIED LEIBNIZ (1646–1716)
IN CONTEXT
BRANCH
Epistemology
APPROACH
Rationalism
BEFORE
1340 Nicolaus of Autrecourt
argues that there are no
necessary truths about the
world, only contingent truths.
1600s René Descartes claims
that ideas come to us in three
ways; they can be derived from
experience, drawn from reason,
or known innately (being
created in the mind by God).
AFTER
1748 David Hume explores the
distinction between necessary
and contingent truths.
1927 Alfred North Whitehead
postulates “actual entities”,
similar to Leibniz’s monads,
which reflect the whole
universe in themselves.
E
arly modern philosophy
is often presented as being
divided into two schools—
that of the rationalists (including
René Descartes, Benedictus
Spinoza, and Immanuel Kant) and
that of the empiricists (including
John Locke, George Berkeley, and
David Hume). In fact, the various
philosophers did not easily fall into
two clear groups, each being like
and unlike each of the others in
complex and overlapping ways.
The essential difference between
the two schools, however, was
epistemological—that is, they
differed in their opinions about
what we can know, and how we
know what we know. Put simply,