THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 79
But what is it
that I am?
A thinking thing.
René Descartes
for abandoning the central Islamic
tenet of the resurrection of the dead.
But in the same century Avicenna’s
work was also translated into Latin,
and his dualism became popular
among Christian philosophers and
theologians. They liked the way his
interpretations of Aristotle’s texts
made them easily compatible with
the idea of an immortal soul.
The indubitable self
Some 200 years later, in the 1250s,
Thomas Aquinas championed a
more faithful interpretation of
Aristotle, in which the mind and
body are much more closely tied
together, and his views were widely
accepted by the theologians of the
16th and 17th centuries. But in 1640
Descartes returned to a dualism
that was nearer to Plato’s than
Aristotle’s, and his argument for
it was very like Avicenna’s.
Descartes imagines that there
is a demon who is trying to deceive
him about everything on which he
might possibly be deceived. The one
thing that he cannot be deceived
about, he realizes, is that he exists.
This self is exactly the self which
Avicenna’s Flying Man is sure of,
when he has no other knowledge.
Like Avicenna, Descartes can then
conclude that the “I”, or self, is
completely distinct from the body,
and that it must be immortal.
The ghost in the machine
One very strong objection to the
dualism of Avicenna or Descartes
is the argument used by Aquinas.
He says that the self which thinks
is the same as the self which feels
sensations in the body. For instance,
I do not just observe that there is
a pain in my leg, in the way that a
sailor might notice a hole in his ship.
The pain belongs to me as much as
my thoughts about philosophy, or
what I might have for lunch.
Most contemporary philosophers
reject mind-body dualism, largely
because of the increasing scientific
knowledge of the brain. Avicenna
and Descartes were both very
interested in physiology and they
produced scientific accounts of
activities such as movement and
sensation. But the process of
rational thinking was inexplicable
with the scientific tools of their
Philip Pullman’s tale, Northern Lights,
picks up on the ancient Greek idea of a
person’s soul, or daimon, being separate
to the body, by presenting it as an
entirely separate animal, such as a cat.
times. We are now able to explain
quite precisely how thinking goes
on in different areas of the brain—
though whether this means that we
can explain thinking without
reference to a self is not so clear.
An influential 20th-century British
philosopher, Gilbert Ryle, caricatured
the dualists’ self as “a ghost in the
machine”, and tried to show that
we can explain how human beings
perceive and function within the
world without resorting to this
“ghost” of a self.
Today philosophers are divided
between a small number of dualists,
a larger number of thinkers who say
that the mind is simply a brain, and
the majority, who agree that thinking
is the result of the physical activity
of the brain, but still insist there is
a distinction between the physical
states of the brain (the gray matter,
the neurons, and so on), and the
thinking which derives from them.
Many philosophers, especially
continental European thinkers, still
accept the results of Avicenna’s
thought experiment in one central
way. It shows, they say, that we each
have a self with a first-person view
of the world (the “I”) that cannot be
accommodated by the objective
view of scientific theories. ■