The EconomistFebruary 29th 2020 Leaders 111A
fghanistan hasbeen at war for more than 40 years—lon-
ger than most of the world’s population has been alive.
America and the insurgents of the Taliban have been battling for
close to 19 years, making the conflict the longest America has
ever fought. Some 2,500 American soldiers have died. The direct
cost to American taxpayers is approaching $1trn. For Afghans,
the toll is much higher. Roughly 3,500 civilians die every year,
and their ravaged country is the poorest in Asia.
It can be only a good thing, therefore, that America and the Ta-
liban plan to sign a peace agreement on Leap Day (February 29th),
provided relative calm prevails until then. America will under-
take to send home most of its 12,000 troops in Afghanistan. In ex-
change, the Taliban will promise not to grant sanctuary to for-
eign terror groups such as al-Qaeda, and to begin
talks with Afghan politicians that will bring an
end to the civil war (see Asia section).
This arrangement is far from perfect, in lots
of ways. America could not force the Taliban to
end hostilities altogether before the signing of
the deal. Either because central commanders
cannot control their disparate fighters or be-
cause they are unwilling to, the best the insur-
gents would offer was a “significant” reduction in violence. In
addition, nobody can be sure what will emerge from the inter-Af-
ghan talks. Elements of the liberal democracy that America at-
tempted to build in Afghanistan are bound to be dismantled. By
making peace with the Taliban on such woolly terms, America is
in effect conceding that it cannot win the war, and that the very
group that sheltered Osama bin Laden and repressed Afghans
with a brutal form of Islamic government should once again
have a big say in how the country is run.
Such a humiliation will be worth it as long as bloodshed de-
creases and the lot of ordinary Afghans improves. That, in turn,
depends on the seriousness and sincerity of all involved. Many
fear that the Taliban are feigning interest in peace, and intend to
seize control of the government by gun or guile as soon as thegis
are gone. Others fear that President Donald Trump doubts the Ta-
liban’s trustworthiness, too, but is pushing on regardless so as to
secure a foreign-policy “victory” to burnish his re-election cam-
paign. The entire peace agreement, by this interpretation, is a
figleaf to disguise an abject American surrender.
That would not just be the crowning humiliation for America;
it would consign Afghanistan to even greater misery. The civil
war would intensify, as regional powers sought to take advan-
tage of America’s absence by funnelling arms to their Afghan al-
lies. And the Taliban could revert to their old ways, barring girls
from school, banning music, stoning adulterers and so on.
The peace agreement tries to guard against such a dismal out-
come by stringing out America’s departure. The
withdrawal will stop, America’s generals insist,
if the Taliban appear to be taking them for a ride.
America will keep warplanes in Afghanistan
during the talks, to support government forces
if the Taliban resume the offensive.
The deterrent has to be credible for this
week’s agreement to have any value. Mr Trump’s
last-minute disavowal of a previous version of
the accord may have helped, by showing that he is not prepared
to accept peace on any terms. But even on its way out, America
will have to maintain an active role in Afghan politics to see the
inter-Afghan talks to a fruitful end. At the moment, it is not clear
who leads the government: two candidates have claimed the job
of president after a disputed election. America will not only have
to knock heads to get civilian politicians to present a vaguely un-
ited front, but also cajole them to give the Taliban concessions
that they have been hoping to avoid.
The signing of the peace accord, in short, is more of a begin-
ning than an end. It does at least put an end in sight. But America
will have to stick to its guns if it is to have any hope of persuading
the Taliban to lay down theirs. 7This way out
America and the Taliban have struck a deal. Now for the hard partThe war in AfghanistanT
hey might not admit it, but Argentina and the imfhave
things in common. Both are under new management. Presi-
dent Alberto Fernández took office in December, two months
after Kristalina Georgieva became head of the fund. Both leaders
want to clean up the mess they inherited. Argentina has failed to
prosper after decades of debt-binges. The imfhas repeatedly
bailed it out. The most recent, botched, rescue in 2018 was the
21st time it has become entangled in the country. Now talks are
under way to sort out Argentina’s finances once again. At stake
are the prospects of 45m Argentines, a mountain of money and
the credibility of Ms Georgieva’s mission to reinvent the imf.
The imf is Argentina’s biggest creditor, holding $44bn of the
$100bn-odd wad of foreign-law debt that Argentina wants to re-
negotiate. Last week the fund made clear that the country’s debt
is unsustainable. Borrowing is approaching 90% of gdp. The
country is reeling from the plunge in the peso, shrivelling re-
serves and a bitter recession. The belt-tightening required to re-
pay all the debts was neither “economically nor politically feasi-
ble”, the fund said.
The easy bit that follows from this—which both Argentina
and the imf agree on—is beating up private creditors, who over
the years have been as credulous as voters and the imf’s techno-New partners, old dance
The imfhas told Argentina’s creditors some harsh truths. Now its government must hear someArgentina and the IMF