71
Desert, became the first member of Stark’s staff, which was never large,
meaning that everyone including Stark had to work extremely hard. By
the time Stark left Iraq in July 1943, there was still a staff of only six (three
in Cairo, two in Iraq, and one in Palestine), all by then under the overall
leadership of Christopher H.O. Scaife (1900–1988). The ‘brothers’
themselves numbered 7000 in Iraq, with 40,000 in Egypt, but very few in
Palestine, where the movement never really amounted to much. After the
war, the Ikhwan organization in Iraq and Palestine was allowed to atro-
phy. In Egypt, it continued into the postwar era as a valuable instrument
of British propaganda, reaching a total maximum membership of
78,000 in 1947.^22
Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the rapid growth and spread
of Freya Stark’s Ikhwan was how she managed to keep her persuasion
apolitical. She readily admitted that many of the young people attracted to
the organization were ardent reformers, keen to engage in leftist politics.
However, in her determination to follow a moderate, nonpolitical course,
Stark resigned herself to the inevitable loss of some of the most promising
young ‘brothers,’ who found her approach altogether too tame. Instead,
she promoted democracy and freedom more as religious ideas than politi-
cal ones. Just as the early Christians had emphasized the redemptive power
of their faith, she sought to empower a ‘band of friendly democrats,’ not
by bribery or coercion but through cooperation and civilized persuasion.
This is not to say that Stark sought to isolate the Ikhwan from the main-
stream of Iraqi political life. On the contrary, she ensured that their voice
was heard among Iraq’s political élite by inviting most of Nuri as-Said’s
cabinet ministers to tea once a month and by shrewdly establishing an
Ikhwan advisory committee on which all were asked to serve. Furthermore,
by creating an organization that was non-British, it would be able to con-
tinue without giving offence to Iraqis after the inevitable waning of British
influence.^23 Even so, in Baghdad Stark had a robust support network of
British friends to encourage her in the cloning of an Iraqi version of the
Egyptian brotherhood. Besides Adrian Bishop and his SOE staff (Aidan
Philip, Seton Lloyd, Teddy Hodgkin, and ‘Jonesy’ Jones), Stark could
count on Ken Cornwallis, on Stewart Perowne, on advisers at the educa-
tion department, on the British Council, and on PAs throughout the
provinces, who long after the war were remembered as friends by Iraqis in
the communities where they had laboured. As Cornwallis wrote to Stark
towards the end of the war: ‘Iraq was in a mess in June 1941, and it
required a concerted and consistent effort to put it right.’^24
RESTORING THE PEACE