73
ities concerned to keep them under close observation and to submit a
weekly report on each of them.^26
The occupation of Syria by Allied forces had rendered it difficult for
Axis agents in Iraq to come into contact or communicate with their col-
leagues in Syria. At the same time, Germany’s invasion of the Soviet Union
had turned the communists in Iraq from a pro-Nazi element into an anti-
Nazi bloc. There was now a growing belief among the Iraqi intelligentsia
that Britain had at last rounded the corner, because of the following five
factors: (1) Britain’s success in crushing the Italians in Africa, (2) in frus-
trating German efforts in Iraq and Syria, and (3) in persisting in its heavy
air attacks against German targets; (4) Germany’s slow progress in the
USSR; and (5) increasing evidence of US support. It had also been seen
that many measures were being taken to purge Iraq of fifth-column activi-
ties. Events favourable to the Allies abroad were to some extent assisting
those whose task was to carry such purges out. Much, however, remained
to be done. It was known that a number of lists had been submitted to the
government by the Iraqi Criminal Investigation Department (CID) of
persons engaged in seditious propaganda, urging that action should be
taken against these individuals as an example to future would-be traitors.
Of these lists, one comprising the names of 60 persons—mostly Iraqis,
and all of them pro-Axis propaganda leaders—had for the time being
apparently been shelved. These persons were still at large spreading propa-
ganda. Action still had to be taken against certain members of the Iraqi
army recently returned from neighbouring countries where they had
sought refuge. Sentence had yet to be passed on Rashid Ali and his imme-
diate followers, while there were some pro-Nazi government officials still
holding office who had been his close supporters. Internment camps had
been advocated, but there was still no sign of them.^27
In closing its July 1941 summary, CICI warned that, though measures
taken by the Iraqi government in the interest of security were good, they
were not yet good enough to beat the Germans. If fifth-column activities
were to be adequately combatted in Iraq, a relentless covert war had to be
waged against disaffected elements. Half-measures were useless. In this
war of constant surprises, Iraq might be offered a brief spell to carry out its
purges before the Nazi threat was once more imminent. Iraq had to make
the most of this breathing space. It was to be hoped that the British author-
ities concerned would render the staunchest support to those Iraqi officials
who, fully alive to their responsibilities, were urging strong action against
one of the most deadly menaces of modern times—the fifth column.^28
RESTORING THE PEACE