74
After the armistice, as CICI became ever more expert at penetrating
and analysing the forces at play in the newly configured polity of Iraq,
they released many summaries over a period of four years that reveal
unique aspects of Iraqi life that had a positive or negative bearing on
national security and the restoration of peace. Surprisingly perhaps,
though outlawed in 1938, communism proved to be an enduring alter-
native to the polar ideals of democracy and fascism in Iraq. In an unchar-
acteristic mood of pragmatism, or maybe just to survive, during the
period before and during the Gaylani interregnum, many of Iraq’s com-
munists had swung their support behind Rashid Ali and had proclaimed
themselves to be pro- Nazi. Obviously, the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact
had had much to do with this temporary compromise. Once the Rashid
Ali regime had collapsed and Hitler had invaded the Soviet Union—
from July 1941 onwards in fact—the Iraqi communists could no longer
support Germany against Stalin. Paradoxically, some organized Iraqi
workers—the railwaymen for example—who used to be communist
while the communists supported Gaylani, turned against communism
after his fall and after Operation BARABAROSSA, and began making
Axis propaganda. CICI was wary of these men, as experience in Egypt
had taught British security intelligence that railway workers had been by
far the most politically restless and violent occupational group in that
country.^29
For security-intelligence purposes, CICI classified the communists of
Iraq in two categories: professed and genuine. The former were defined
as those who adopted (or professed to adopt) the communist creed mainly
to achieve political prominence. For them, communism was merely a
means to an end: the back door to political significance. In terms of any
communist ‘security threat,’ CICI considered such people unimportant.
The second category, on the other hand, consisted mostly of artisans,
shopkeepers, middle-class officials, and teachers. They could exert con-
siderable influence by means of propaganda, because most of them were
young, energetic, and had the courage of their own convictions. They
were fairly well organized, and they produced their own official organ:
As-Sharara (The Spark). Obviously, these ideological communists were
perplexed by Hitler’s sudden switch from Soviet ally to enemy in late June
1941 and had to await instructions from Moscow on how they should
proceed, especially towards the British—previously their foe, as the prin-
cipal proponents of capitalism, but now their friend. Before the new party
line had been clarified, CICI noticed that anti-British communist