84
those interned, the most dangerous on the British list remained at large.
Nevertheless, the disconcerting effect of the arrests on the pro-Nazi ele-
ment did not diminish over time, and produced noticeable results. There
was a clear reduction in alarmist rumours and loose talk. Reports were
received that, soon after the arrests, certain other Nazi sympathizers, fear-
ful of internment, were losing no time in emphasizing their attachment to
the Allied cause. However, by mid-September, at the lowest point of Allied
misfortune and amidst great general pessimism about the war situation in
the Caucasus, only 21 of the 75 on the DSO list had been interned, and
an overall total of only 71 found themselves in the Amara camp. Apart
from the 21 dangerous men, most of the other internees were of the
effendi class and barely known to DSO. This failure to intern important
Axis supporters, coupled with the recent news that six internees, one of
them especially dangerous, had been transferred from the camp to a
Baghdad hospital run by a notoriously pro-Nazi doctor, Sabhi Wahbi, was
a matter of growing concern.^52 DSO were in no doubt that the hospital
was being used as a propaganda base and possibly even as a collection
point for intelligence to be transmitted to the enemy. Hospital transfers
were anyway well-known to DSO as a means of deflecting the harsh impact
of internment; security officers commonly referred to them disparagingly
as ‘hospital wangles.’ DSO were generally unhappy that security at Amara
was so lax that internees were able to communicate without censorship
with the outside world through various channels, such as visiting female
relatives, children allowed to be interned with their fathers, servants
allowed to enter and exit the camp at will, and easily corrupted Iraqi camp
staff. Some internees were so well-connected that they even managed to
prevent measures from being introduced that would improve camp
security.^53
As German successes on the battlefield during the summer of 1942
continued to encourage those Iraqis who still empathized with Nazism,
there was concern about the fluidity of the security situation. It was as if
every step forward were offset by a retrograde development of some kind.
Even as arrests and internments were being carried out, destabilizing pro-
Axis personalities continued to enter Iraq unimpeded. In September, for
instance, a group of teachers arrived in Baghdad from Syria that included
Bahiya Halawa, a known pro-Nazi and supporter of Rashid Ali. Meanwhile,
in the far north of the country, among the people of Erbil, the majority of
whom, being Kurds and Assyrians, were thankfully pro-British, there was
no security at all. The population was generally poor, with some literally