The Baghdad Set_ Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45

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  1. Ibid., 4–5.

  2. See James R. Vaughan, The Failure of American and British Propaganda in
    the Arab Middle East, 1945–57: Unconquerable Minds (Basingstoke:
    Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 27.

  3. Stark, Dust in the Lion’s Paw, 139. For a charming portrayal of Nuri Pasha,
    the staunchest of Britain’s Iraqi friends during good times and bad, see
    Christopher Birdwood, Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership (London:
    Cassell, 1959), 187–201.

  4. Cornwallis to Stark, 27 January 1945, Container 12.2 (Sir Kinahan
    Cornwallis), Series II Correspondence, 1893–1985, HRC. Misquoted by
    Stark in Dust in the Lion’s Paw, 118.

  5. I(b) Monthly Summary: July 1941, CICI Iraq c/o Air HQ Iraq, 1 August
    1941, AIR 29/2510, TNA.

  6. Ibid.

  7. Ibid.

  8. Ibid.

  9. Appendix to MEIC Summary No. 577, 11 August 1941, WO 208/1560,
    TNA.

  10. Appendix G to I(b) Summary No. 18, CICI Iraq, 31 December 1941,
    AIR 29/2510, TNA.

  11. For more about Sami Shawkat, see Chap. 6.

  12. Ibid; I(b) Summary, CICI Iraq, 1–15 October 1941, AIR 29/2510,
    TNA. See also Nissim Rejwan, The Last Jews in Baghdad: Remembering a
    Lost Homeland (Austin, TX: University of Texas Press, 2004), 153.

  13. Appendix G to I(b) Summary No. 18, CICI Iraq, 31 December 1941,
    AIR 29/2510, TNA.

  14. I(b) Summary, CICI Iraq, 1–15 November 1941, AIR 29/2510, TNA.

  15. Security Intelligence Summary No. 39, CICI Iraq, 20 September 1942,
    AIR 29/2506, TNA.

  16. Communism in Iraq, CX report, 16 April 1944, WO 201/2866, TNA.

  17. Communism in Iraq, Appendix A, Security Intelligence Summary No. 63,
    Defence Security Office, CICI Iraq, 1 March–1 June 1944, AIR 29/2512,
    TNA.

  18. CICI Weekly Intelligence Summary and Précis of Information No. 17, 7
    June 1941, AIR 29/2504, TNA; Edy Cohen, ‘The Farhoud Remembered’,
    BESA Perspectives, no. 484 (2 June 2017). Various theories have been
    advanced concerning the withholding of KINGCOL troops camped just
    outside the city from intervening in the riots. Certainly they could have
    done so more swiftly than Kurds from northern Iraq. The consensus seems
    to be that the FO, through Cornwallis, prevented their use because the
    reinstalled Regent would have lost face, had he been so overtly backed by
    British forces. See inter alia Orit Bashkin, New Babylonians: A History of


RESTORING THE PEACE
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