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assurance that they would be safe from reprisals, then the effectiveness of
SOE’s preparations would be significantly diminished. Ultimately, of
course, Domvile’s caveats had no effect: Cairo stated bluntly that there
was no hope of the government’s supporting even the minimum aspira-
tions of the Kurds, and success with the southern Arab tribes would
depend entirely on whether effective political work could be done among
tribal leaders immediately prior to any invasion.^34 For the rest, Bishop’s
(and Chapman’s) preparations met with overall approval. The main con-
cern for SOE of course remained the denial of oil infrastructure. It was
estimated that the military demolition plans to be executed by Tenth
Army would put all IPC oil wells out of action for at least six months after
an invasion.^35 But then it would be SOE’s task to extend denial indefi-
nitely by means of (1) local sabotage to pipelines and machinery and (2)
local sabotage to oil wells that had been rebored by the enemy. To these
ends, while the army could mount large-scale commando or airborne
raids, SOE would be required to undertake large-scale tribal raids. Bishop’s
summary overview for August 1942 reads as follows:
Overt preparations amongst the Kurds in the north are not possible, as they
would immediately attract the attention of the Iraq Government, who are
particularly susceptible to any encouragement being given to the Kurds. We
have made preliminary plans for Kurdish guerrilla activities in the
Sulaymaniyah-Erbil-Rowanduz areas controlled by a British Kurdish expert
[Lyon], under whom will be six British officers. In central Iraq, cells for the
reception and onward transmission of messages and stores are being orga-
nized in the holy cities of Kerbala and Hejaf, as well as couriers to operate
along the smuggler routes between Kuwait and the middle Euphrates. In
Baghdad political activities have resulted in the formation of a strong party
of young politicians who favour Great Britain, and who would be ready to
help in forming a government if a political crisis arose. In southern Iraq, the
Regent has already given us eight potential W/T operators for training.
These will remain behind in suitable areas to maintain contact with support-
ers. The organization of courier services between the Mediterranean and
Red Sea is nearly completed.^36Such was the state of things as Bishop embarked unwittingly upon the
final months of his life. On 5 September 1942, Lord Glenconner (1899–
1993) (A/D.3) appointed him to the new position of regional head for
SOE Iraq and Persia with headquarters at Baghdad.^37 When Bishop died a
month later, John Chapman was immediately appointed his successor as
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