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regional commander, with Aidan Philip as field commander for Iraq and
John Underwood as field commander for Persia. Understandably, in the
light of such upheaval, Glenconner deemed it appropriate to visit Baghdad
and Tehran in person. This was a crucial moment in the history of SOE in
the region. By creating a new regional command, essentially detaching
SOE Persia and Iraq from Middle East Command (MEC) and pivoting
the new organizational structure towards the newly created Persia and Iraq
Command (PAIC) under the dynamic and popular General Sir Henry
Maitland ‘Jumbo’ Wilson, Baghdad rather than Cairo could finally func-
tion as the true regional operational centre. Consequently, while mourn-
ing the tragic loss of their beloved commander, the staff in Baghdad
doubtless enjoyed a brief feeling of relief and excitement at the prospect of
greater autonomy. But the euphoria was not to last, for when Glenconner
released his trip report on 2 November after returning to Cairo, it was
apparent that he had decided to tighten, not loosen the reins. In future, all
new SOE projects were to be forwarded to SOE Cairo for approval before
submission to a new subcommittee charged with investigating the rela-
tionship between the regional commander (Chapman) and the political
and military authorities in Baghdad (and Tehran). Glenconner’s report,
clearly based on information supplied by Bishop during the summer, out-
lined broad preoccupational and postoccupational plans for SOE activities
in the region. During the preoccupational phase in Iraq, such activities had
to be directed towards (1) increasing SOE’s prestige and authority; (2)
penetrating the Iraqi army and other pro-Axis elements; (3) restraining the
activities of younger radical, pro-British politicians; and (4) countering
enemy agents and propaganda. For the postoccupational phase, five
schemes had been established: (1) providing communications between the
evacuated Iraqi government and its supporters; (2) support for the Kurds
(the PLUM scheme) and Yezidis (including 6 British officers and approxi-
mately 15 tons of explosives, weapons, and devices); (3) communications
with the young pro-British radicals; (4) evacuation of Iraqi notables; and
(5) preparation of 10 Armenian staybehind W/T operators. According to
Glenconner, the preoccupational preparations completed by Bishop,
Chapman (in the Kurdish north), Domvile (in the Arab south), and other
members of the Iraq field force were deserving of ‘great credit.’^38
Unfortunately, the appointment of the Kurdish tribal expert John
Chapman, an Indian Army reserve officer (IARO),^39 as regional com-
mander proved to be an unmitigated disaster on many levels. To begin
with, extracting him from the clutches of his employers (IPC in Kirkuk)