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and black propaganda in the Middle East. As can be seen from SOE
operations in Iraq, the field command was heavily invested in propaganda
operations, which formed an integral part of preoccupational and postoc-
cupational operational planning. No matter what agreements might have
been reached in London, to remove SOE’s planning staff and covert-
broadcasting activities from Cairo, Baghdad, and Tehran and transfer
them to PWE was simply out of the question. Glenconner was of course
well aware that this was a case of a London-based turf war between SOE
and the FO (responsible for PWE) slopping over into his bailiwick with
scant consideration shown for the unique operational conditions prevail-
ing in the Middle East. Predictably, the FO ultimately prevailed, but it was
not until April 1943 that the SOE special planning department (G-2
Plans) responsible for broadcasting was finally disbanded and its work
transferred to PWE.^44
However, at the operational level in Iraq, nothing changed, mainly
because Pat Domvile took the initiative and unilaterally assumed responsi-
bility for SOE broadcast propaganda and plans, which consequently
remained fully functional. Beyond radio broadcasts though, at the Baghdad
level the political work of SOE faced other challenges. It often had the
superficial appearance of duplicating or trespassing on the functions of
Stewart Perowne’s embassy publicity department, with which, as we have
seen, SOE had even shared physical premises until acquiring their riverside
property at South Gate. Beneath the surface, the relationship was highly
nuanced. To get the best results, there clearly had to be the closest possi-
ble collaboration between the covert (black) work of SOE (even where it
had an overt appearance) and the truly overt (white) publicity and propa-
ganda role of the embassy, which was aimed at the creation of better rela-
tions between the British and various Iraqi elements. In such a sensitive
situation, one could easily imagine rivalry and conflict developing between
the two principal representatives: John Chapman and Stewart Perowne.
Unfortunately, Baker Street seems to have nurtured a misplaced faith in
Chapman’s ability to ‘manage’ Perowne, so as not merely to prevent him
from feeling that SOE were trespassing on his preserves, but also to secure
considerable help from him for SOE’s work without his realizing the true
extent of SOE’s objectives. Had Adrian Bishop, who knew Perowne well,
still been SOE field commander, he might well have accomplished this
with relative ease, but the inflexible, unimaginative Chapman was no
match for the wily, witty Perowne. In the end, a crisis was only averted by
Chapman’s dismissal and the appointment of Aidan Philip as field