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friend: ‘I don’t want to be thought to criticize military intelligence—I
fully realize that there are some people who are so underprivileged men-
tally that some place must be found for them. It used, of course, to be the
cavalry, but since the days of mechanization that avenue is pretty well
closed. Only the intelligence remains. It is a merciful arrangement. Fellow
subjects who would continually feel out of their depth in normal society
are all brought together, and all paddle safely in the intelligence pool.
Personally, since subnormal psychology is one of my hobbies, I enjoy read-
ing intelligence reports. I know it’s escapism, but I don’t mind confessing
that, particularly in wartime, I find that I do want something to read which
has no connection with reality.’^19
The original CICI charter really dealt only with local conditions and
CICI’s function as a clearing-house for local intelligence. CICI’s place in
the larger landscape or ‘spyscape’^20 of Second World War intelligence and
counterintelligence—the waging of secret warfare against the Axis, and
the imperative of securing Allied lines of communication and strategic
assets throughout the Empire—was not mentioned. Not spelled out, for
instance, was the fact that CICI was the brainchild of SIME,^21 and that
Elphinston answered ultimately not to the GOC, the AOC, or the ambas-
sador, but to Raymond Maunsell in Cairo and through him to the Security
Service (MI5) in London. It appears likely therefore that the charter was
drafted primarily to define a clear division of responsibilities within the
local ‘spyscape’ between Cornwallis, as an advocate for FO policy and
interests, and Elphinston with respect to political intelligence, publicity,
and propaganda. From the terms of the charter, it can be clearly seen that
the FO wished MI5 and SIME to stay away from those areas, and to con-
centrate on counterintelligence and security-intelligence work to the
exclusion of almost all else. It is equally clear that CICI rather than the
embassy was required to collate and disseminate T&P intelligence gath-
ered by political advisers under Cornwallis’s control, along with all other
local intelligence. This was simply because in the midst of war all the dis-
tribution networks were under military control. Therefore, for collation
and distribution purposes, a CICI section for T&P intelligence was estab-
lished under C.S. Hill, with all other operations subsumed under the
Defence Security Office (DSO), headed by Dawson-Shepherd.^22
With implementation of the charter well under way, Elphinston was
replaced by Chokra Wood on 15 August 1941. All seem to have been
running smoothly when Wood took over, except for one factor: the RAF’s
continued administration of CICI. When ‘I’ Branch was replaced by the