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new interservice formation, there was no apparent reason for replacing the
administrative infrastructure too, as the RAF had all the necessary resources
already in place and had established an administrative routine covering
such aspects as finance and transport. However, endless difficulties soon
emerged concerning officers’ pay, transport hirings and equipment, the
war establishment, and replacements.^23 Aside from administrative con-
cerns, one of Wood’s initial tasks was to deal with the security situation in
Persia, which was occupied by British and Soviet forces two weeks after his
arrival in Baghdad. He was asked by GHQ India for his proposals and
recommendations to form a nonoperational^24 intelligence organization
under CICI. To this end, Wood visited Persia to discuss his proposed lay-
out with Sir Reader Bullard at the Tehran legation and to obtain Bullard’s
agreement to the establishment of a DSO in Tehran with five ALOs in the
provinces.^25 Armed with Bullard’s consent, Wood then proceeded to
GHQ India in November to obtain final approval, which was granted by
the Chiefs of Staff on 23 December 1941. From then on, the Baghdad
centre was retitled the Combined Intelligence Centre Iraq and Persia
(retaining the acronym CICI), and Wood now had two security sections
working under him: Dawson-Shepherd’s in Baghdad and E.L. ‘Joe’
Spencer’s in Tehran. When Persia and Iraq Command (PAIC) was formed
in September 1942, these security sections were enlarged and reorganized
as two defence security offices (DSO Iraq under Dawson-Shepherd and
DSO Persia under Spencer) to conform with the other SIME defence
security offices throughout the Middle East.
By the time CICI was originally formed during the summer of 1941,
the German attack on the Soviet Union in June had given Iraq a new sig-
nificance in the general strategy of the Second World War, not only because
of the country’s oil installations, but also as a channel for Lend-Lease aid
to Russia and as a possible arena for military operations. Thus Iraq’s
security had become a priority consideration. However, in the aftermath of
the Rashid Ali coup and the brief war within a war that had been resolved
ultimately by a British invasion and occupation, the country was not yet
stable or secure. Even at the best of times, there were few countries beset
with so many security problems as Iraq. The tribal and minority problems
of the Kurds, the Assyrians, the Armenians, and the Jews were complex;
the divisions between Sunni and Shia Muslims were profound; the dispa-
rate political loyalties separating pro-British and anti-British Iraqis even
within families were entrenched. And there were wider Middle Eastern
concerns such as Arab unity and the Palestine problem. Coupled with all
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