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States and the Soviet Union that were unloaded at the Shatt al-Arab for
overland rail and road transport through Persia to the Russian border. It
was also important because of the endless stream of tankers carrying vital
oil supplies from Abadan and Bahrein to various war theatres, and because
most troop movements to and from the region were routed via Basra. The
question of port security was first raised during negotiations in mid-1942
for the establishment of CICI control at the Abadan oil refinery. It was
decided to appoint a port security officer (PSO) to cover the Shatt al-Arab
ports, and that the War Office (WO) should conduct an expert investiga-
tion into the whole problem of port security in the Shatt al-Arab area. It
was also decided that CICI would henceforth be responsible for the colla-
tion of intelligence on the southern Gulf coast and Oman. The WO expert
duly visited the area and made his recommendations, as a consequence of
which the PSO Shatt al-Arab assumed responsibility for the security of
Basra, Abadan, Khorramshahr, Fao (al-Faw), and Bandar Shahpur.
Supervising him, a security control officer (SCOPG) was then attached to
the staff of the Assistant Defence Security Officer (ADSO) Basra. This
setup was in operation between late-1942 and March 1944, when the
SCOPG position was abolished, and his responsibilities were assumed by
ADSO Basra, using the FSS to ensure operational port security and
answering directly to DSO Iraq. No dedicated FSS unit was posted to the
Gulf ports; however, all local FSS units were kept on call for port security
duty as needed and in accordance with their ability and availability.^33
Throughout the war, whether due to the incompetence of the Axis or to
the vigilance of the ADSO, it is truly remarkable that not a single act of
enemy sabotage was carried out in the Persian Gulf.^34
Primarily because of the vital oil infrastructure in the region, any serious
act of sabotage would have amounted to a strategic, not a tactical victory
for the enemy. In fact, the protection of oil installations in southwestern
Persia and in Kurdistan was a major concern and responsibility for
PAIFORCE, one that involved CICI not so much at the DSO HQ level as
in the field, where ALOs were instrumental in the implementation of oil-
security policy.^35 During the early days of PAIFORCE, the security of oil
installations was not specifically allotted to CICI. It was then thought that
the installations had their own efficient security organization, particularly
in Persia, and furthermore that the oil companies might resent military
interference. In mid-1942, however, it became apparent that this was not
the case; AIOC actually approached the military authorities for assistance
with security problems at the great Abadan refinery. In Iraq, at Khanaqin