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near the Persian frontier and at Kirkuk in Kurdistan, similar problems were
to be found, but on a much reduced scale. Internal security at these oil
supply points became the responsibility of a security officer (SO) at
Khanaqin and the local ALO at Kirkuk, both assisted by FSS NCOs work-
ing under their supervision. A regime of periodical security tests was suc-
cessful in pinpointing weaknesses in the control system. However, much
diplomacy was called for when dealing with the oil companies, who often
seemed more concerned about postwar market prospects than the imme-
diate problems of wartime security.
External liaison between CICI and the Iraqis, the Americans, the Free
Poles, and other British organizations accounted for much of the work of
CICI staff based in Baghdad. Cooperation with the Iraqi CID has already
been mentioned. It was arduous at first, but thanks largely to the presence
of a British CID adviser, J.T. Wilkins, it gradually became so successful
that it was possible to establish a joint Anglo-Iraqi Security Board (AISB)
in November 1943, which included PAIFORCE representatives. Joint
interrogations became feasible, DSO’s requests for arrests were promptly
executed, and DSO officers were even occasionally permitted to join Iraqi
police in house-to-house searches.
Relations with American intelligence and security evolved variously
depending on whether CICI officers were dealing with the legation diplo-
mats, the G2 military attaché (MA), or agents of the Office of Strategic
Services (OSS). Between 1941 and 1943, largely because of personal
friendships, DSO maintained such close contact with the legation staff
that US and British intelligence operated more or less in unison. However,
towards the end of 1943, the legation experienced an almost total change
of staff; individuals of a somewhat different calibre and more independent
type appeared.^36 Endeavours by DSO to secure the same friendly reciprocal
relations with the newcomers proved less than successful, though Wood
and Dawson-Shepherd did their utmost to preserve an atmosphere of cor-
diality and relative openness. With the MA, relations were good as long as
the American steered clear of political and tribal affairs—not always the
case. However, DSO noticed that there was over time an ever- widening
gap between the MA and the State Department officials, meaning that
DSO frequently had to duplicate their communications with the two con-
flicting parties at the US legation, which was of course tiresome and coun-
terproductive. Finally, with OSS it was a different story: because of Chokra
Wood’s firm friendship with Art Dayton, the OSS chief agent, the closest
touch was maintained, and the utmost assistance was provided. The CICI
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