131
had not put the RAF ‘I’ Branch records to the flames, though he was on
the verge of doing so shortly before the siege of Habbaniya was lifted.
DSO subsequently helped ISLD rebuild their local registry, which
ensured that there was a spirit of positive cooperation between these
local proxies of MI5 and MI6. Equally positive relations existed between
CICI and the commercial and public-relations sections of the embassy.
In the latter case, despite his jaundiced view of military intelligence,
Stewart Perowne had no choice but to rely upon the CICI registry when
researching local personalities whom his section wished to cultivate. The
records section would receive up to five requests a day from Perowne’s
section and often provided advice on the advisability of converting cer-
tain Iraqis from pro-Nazi sympathies to pro-British support. In return,
the quid pro quo arrangement between the two organizations was such
that Perowne would then forward to Dawson-Shepherd any useful infor-
mation obtained from the personalities in question. What remains
unclear is how much of this valuable information was also passed by
Perowne to Adrian Bishop and the SOE organization at South Gate. As
one might imagine, close liaison was maintained between CICI and
other armed forces formations. The chief intelligence officer (CIO) at
RAF headquarters and general staff intelligence (GSI) at PAIFORCE
headquarters were in close touch at all times. The latter connection was
particularly important because the FSS, upon whom CICI relied to carry
out counterespionage and security controls, was technically under GSI
command.^38
As in Persia, vetting measures in Iraq originally evolved in an unofficial
ad hoc manner, with bodies like the embassy public-relations section, the
United Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC), and the Iraq
Petroleum Company (IPC) informally consulting Wood or Dawson-
Shepherd about prospective contacts or employees. In 1943, however, an
Indian Political Intelligence Bureau (PIB) establishment was sanctioned
to operate the vetting of all Allied forces’ local employees, as well as the
local employees of most British organizations. To perform this task, the
Iraq PIB staff were permitted access to the CICI registry index, but not to
the secret files. If they needed to consult classified records, a DSO
employee would first examine the file and decide if access could be granted.
If the subject had never been carded, DSO would conduct the necessary
enquiries on behalf of the PIB. The total number of employees of a confi-
dential nature vetted by DSO for the PIB during the year 1943–1944 was
approximately 7000.
THE MOON PALACE