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question that the T&P appreciations distributed by CICI between the
armistice and the end of the war deal largely with Kurdish affairs, and to a
far lesser extent with issues concerning the other minorities and the Shias.
For the most part, the reports on Kurdish matters are framed by political
and military considerations, sometimes with strategic or national implica-
tions, whereas the reports on the Shia Arab tribes describe local and indi-
vidual events and measures taken to remedy problems at the tribal or
personality level.^60
In addition to such routine reporting, in July 1941, in the aftermath of
the Gaylani interregnum, ‘CJ’ Edmonds wrote a special appreciation of
the attitude of the Kurds towards Britain which summarizes the situation
better than any account to be found in the secondary literature. He wrote:
‘Kurdish nationalities can be roughly divided into two groups: (a) those
who, in spite of past experiences, cling to the belief that the British gov-
ernment will yet do something to get justice for Kurdistan; and (b) the
realists who have made up their minds that, whereas the Arabs fit into the
British imperial scheme, the Kurds obviously do not, and that therefore it
is foolish to expect British policy to upset the Arabs for the sake of the
Kurds.’ Edmonds saw Sheikh Mahmud Barzanji’s supporters as belonging
to the first group, and most Kurdish intellectuals, including military offi-
cers, as belonging to the second.^61 Those Kurds familiar with the British
from first-hand experience generally preferred their friendship to that of
the Germans or the Russians. Regarding the Iraqi Arabs, the majority of
Kurds were unanimous in their view that they should keep out of Arab
political squabbles: interfering between Arab factions would be like the
stranger interfering in a quarrel between a man and his wife—the reward
would be only ‘kicks and no thanks.’^62
Ultimately, ‘CJ’ Edmonds perceived Kurdistan to be a vital constituent
of the Iraqi nation; he also felt that the Ottomans had grasped this funda-
mental truth by decentralizing the Mesopotamian polity. ‘Iraq cannot be
healthy without a contented Kurdistan,’ Edmonds wrote in the summer of
- ‘Kurdistan and the Kurds have been deliberately kept back in mat-
ters of education, development, and social services as a result of the pan-
Arab bias of the central government. ... The best remedy for these ills
would be a return to the old Turkish system of vilayets, of which Iraq
could be conveniently divided into five, but that is a big question.’ Too big
it would seem to have been seriously contemplated at a time when Iraq’s
wounds had yet to heal, and the British were fast approaching the worst
period of the war. Edmonds fully appreciated the circumstances, saying:
THE MOON PALACE