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working in Iraqi schools. In the commercial and industrial sectors, the
banks, oil companies, and engineering firms had a major contribution to
make to the security of Iraq. Private British businesses, however, needed
to improve their performance in such areas as productivity, ethical trad-
ing, product reliability, and employee welfare, if they were to cope suc-
cessfully with increasing competition from American enterprises
throughout the region. Greater familiarity with the cultures and lan-
guages of Iraq was definitely called for.^65
In addressing the ticklish question of the withdrawal of British forces
from the region now that the European war was over, and the effect that
their absence might have on the security situation, Dawson-Shepherd was
realistic but vague. He seems to have accepted that ideally what would
remain would be the British military mission, the ALOs, and some kind of
RAF presence, including an intelligence element. Beyond this, one senses
great uncertainty. The imponderables in Iraqi internal security that had
given the wing commander such pause are then enumerated and examined
in some detail—the Iraqi army, communism, the Kurds, and the Jews. If
crises arising in connection with these potential hotspots were caused by
internal forces, then Dawson-Shepherd was confident in the Iraqi govern-
ment’s ability, given good intelligence, to resolve them in a timely fashion.
If, however, the causes of problems with the communists, Kurds, or Jews
were external in origin and long-term in nature, then he was less sanguine
about their positive resolution. Therefore, the influence of the USSR on
Kurdish politics and the influence of Zionism on Jewish youth were highly
volatile, unpredictable factors. As for the Iraqi army, that was a unique
internal-security factor unto itself, which merited entirely separate consid-
eration. Certainly, the wholesale retirement of the Sherifian officer corps
and its replacement with a new generation of young officers boded well
for the future.
Dawson-Shepherd’s conclusion was straightforward: horror vacui. If
Britain were to abandon the Iraqi Arabs and leave the Middle East, then
the Soviet Union would immediately fill the void. ‘The future of the secu-
rity situation in Iraq,’ he wrote, ‘while thus bound up with the future of
Anglo-Iraqi and therefore Anglo-Arab relations, is dependent not on the
presence of our armed forces, but on our extensive knowledge of the
country and the mutual goodwill built up by political and civil means.’
Seen through the eyes of CICI, as long as the vital importance of Iraq’s oil
and strategic location prevented Britain from discarding the special and
privileged position it once again enjoyed, then the future security of Iraq
THE MOON PALACE