Examples of national MOFA codes are ABYS (Abyssinian), HUN
(Hungarian), IRQ (Iraqi), PAL (Palestinian), RUS (Russian), and SYR
(Syrian).
I(b) Summary, CICI Iraq, 1–15 September 1941, AIR 29/2510, TNA;
I(b) Summary No. 17, CICI Iraq, 15 December 1941, AIR 29/2510,
TNA. It is not known for certain if there was any intervention, perhaps by
MI6, to prevent Hall from reaching Germany, and to redirect him to
Ethiopia, but something of the sort must have occurred. For more about
the Halls of Ethiopia, see Toby Berger Holtz, ‘The Hall Family and
Ethiopia: A Century of Involvement’, ed. Svein Ege et al., Proceedings of
the 16th International Conference of Ethiopian Studies (Trondheim:
Norwegian University of Science and Technology, 2009), 109–17; Richard
Pankhurst, ‘A History of Early Twentieth Century Ethiopia: Mussolini and
Ethiopia’, Link Ethiopia, https://www.linkethiopia.org/article/8-mussolini-
and-ethiopia/.
For the FSS, see Chap. 7 and Adrian O’Sullivan, Nazi Secret Warfare in
Occupied Persia (Iran): The Failure of the German Intelligence Services,
1939–45 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) [NSW], 24–5;
O’Sullivan, ‘Joe Spencer’s Ratcatchers’: 297–8; A.F. Judge, ‘The Field
Security Sections of the Intelligence Corps, 1939 to 1960’, unpublished
MS, Military Intelligence Museum and Archives, Chicksands, Bedfordshire.
See Chaps. 9 and 10.
Judge, ‘Field Security Sections’, 1.
Very late in the war, the Germans are known to have planned at least two
operations against Abadan and Persian Gulf shipping: REISERNTE and
KINO, both of which failed. For details, see Chap. 9 and NSW, 208–11.
See Appendix E. It is clear from the distribution of political and security
personnel that priority was given by CICI to the Kurdish and Persian Gulf
regions.
Changes actually began even earlier than this, after the sudden death of the
Anglophile US resident minister Paul Knabenshue (1883–1942) and his
replacement by Loy Henderson, whose attitude towards British influence
was less compliant. See Christopher D. O’Sullivan, FDR and the End of
Empire: The Origins of American Power in the Middle East (Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 37. For an interesting, sympathetic view of
Knabenshue’s term of office in Baghdad, see James A. Thorpe, ‘The
United States and the 1940–1941 Anglo-Iraqi Crisis: American Policy in
Transition’, Middle East Journal 25, no. 1 (Winter 1971): 79–89.
The theme of America’s postwar commercial interests as a significant factor
in wartime Anglo-American intelligence relations is mentioned again in
Chap. 10.
