For the organization of general staff intelligence, see ‘Notes on the British
General Staff, Arms and Services’, Tactical and Technical Trends, no. 11 (5
November 1942). Tactical and Technical Trends was published by the US
Military Intelligence Service from June 1942 to June 1945.
I(b) Summary No. 19, CICI Iraq, 1–15 January 1942, AIR 29/2510,
TNA. Other pro-Nazis with MOFA numbers considered dangerous were
the director of culture and training, Fadhil Jamali (MOFA IRQ/10), and
Mudhaffar az-Zahawi (MOFA IRQ/82), the owner of a petrol filling sta-
tion at Khanaqin (Persia) and close associate of Rashid Ali (with a German
wife).
Ibid.; I(b) Summary No. 21, CICI Iraq, 1–15 February 1942, AIR
29/2510, TNA.
Sami Shawkat, Hadhihi Ahdafuna: Majmu’ah muḥaḍarat wa-maqalat
wa-Aḥadith qawmiyah (Baghdad: Majallah al-Mutallim al-Jadid, 1939), ̣
cited by Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin Cüppers, Halbmond und
Hakenkreuz: Das Dritte Reich, die Araber und Palästina (Darmstadt:
WBG, 2006), 47, as Dies sind unsere Ziele [These are our aims].
I(b) Summary No. 19, CICI Iraq, 1–15 January 1942, AIR 29/2510,
TNA; I(b) Summary No. 21, CICI Iraq, 1–15 February 1942, AIR
29/2510, TNA.
Security Intelligence Summary No. 50, Defence Security Office, CICI
Iraq, 23 January 1943, AIR 29/2511, TNA.
There were two principal German foreign-intelligence services: (1) the
Abwehr (full title: Amt Ausland/Abwehr) commanded by Admiral
Wilhelm Canaris of the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (Army High
Command [OKW]); and (2) the SS-Auslandsnachrichtendienst (SS
Foreign Intelligence Service—often inaccurately termed the
Sicherheitsdienst [SS Security Service] or SD, of which it was really only a
constituent part [SD-Ausland]). Unlike most intelligence historians, I refer
to this SS service throughout the book, pedantically but correctly, not as
the SD, but as RSHA VI (Branch VI of the Reich Security Administration),
its true title. RSHA VI was commanded first by the deeply flawed Heinz
Jost and then by the ambitious but sickly Walter Schellenberg. Neither
man displayed any interest in Iraq, unlike Canaris who certainly did. For
more about the organization of German intelligence, see NSW, 37–42;
David Kahn, Hitler’s Spies: German Military Intelligence in World War II
(New York: Da Capo Press, 1978), 238–50.
Operation MAMMUT (see Chap. 9 ).
Security Intelligence Summary No. 57, Defence Security Office, CICI
Iraq, 29 July 1943, AIR 29/2511, TNA.
Ibid.
It has already been noted that the Anglo-Iraqi Security Board (AISB) was
indeed established in November 1943.
