The Baghdad Set_ Iraq through the Eyes of British Intelligence, 1941–45

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  1. Ibid.

  2. The definition of ‘nonoperational intelligence’ adopted by MEDC was
    ‘political and economic intelligence and security intelligence in respect of
    the civil population of the Middle East and the Allied forces located in the
    Middle East including counterespionage and countersabotage.’ Lascelles
    to CGS PAIFORCE, 7 July 1943, WO 201/1404, TNA.  The agencies
    seen to be responsible for nonoperational intelligence were identified as
    CICI, ISLD, SOE, GSI, and RAF Intelligence. Fuller to Kenny, 23 July
    1943, WO 201/1404, TNA.

  3. Wood to Minister of State, 16 July 1943, WO 201/1404, TNA.

  4. Ibid.

  5. MEDC to COS, 4 September 1943, WO 201/1404, TNA.

  6. Wood to Kenny, CICI/H/87, n.d., WO 201/1404, TNA.

  7. H.I.  Allen, DDMI Security at the WO and a member of the Joint
    Intelligence Subcommittee.

  8. Intelligence derived from openly available sources. The information
    acquired by the PAs and ALOs would nowadays be categorized as ASI (all-
    source intelligence); in other words, all kinds of information derived from
    both overt and covert sources. Cf. Martin Thomas, Empires of Intelligence:
    Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley, CA: University
    of California Press, 2008), 2.

  9. In reserving the function of gathering T&P intelligence for his own advis-
    ers, Cornwallis was presumably influenced by the theory of the primacy of
    local intelligence over strategic intelligence advocated by his (and his friend
    Gertrude Bell’s) mentor Sir Percy Cox (1864–1937)  in the context of
    Mesopotamia and Mandate Iraq. See A.L. Macfie, ‘British Intelligence and
    the Causes of Unrest in Mesopotamia, 1919–21’, Middle Eastern Studies
    35, no. 1 (January 1999): 165–77.

  10. See Ashley Jackson, Persian Gulf Command: A History of the Second World
    War in Iran and Iraq (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018),
    102–3.

  11. Clayton to Stark, 2 January 1942, Container 11.1 (Sir Iltyd Clayton),
    Series II Correspondence, 1893–1985, Harry Ransom Center, The
    University of Texas, Austin, TX [HRC].

  12. For the finer details about the minorities, see generally ‘CJ’ Edmonds’
    many letters to Sir Kinahan Cornwallis at Iraq Political Situation, 1939–
    1941, File 3, Box 2, Cecil John Edmonds Collection, GB165-0095,
    MECA.

  13. For more about Sheikh Mahmud, see Chap. 9 ; also Adrian O’Sullivan,
    ‘German Covert Initiatives and British Intelligence in Persia (Iran), 1939–
    1945’, DLitt et Phil diss. (UNISA, 2013), 142–3. For a contemporary
    OSS appreciation, see Art Dayton and Hans Hoff ’s OSS Report G 5076,


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