155
In addition to the Tel Kotchek control, the FSS conducted searches of the
train en route between the frontier and Mosul. Though technically illegal,
these searches allowed CICI to confiscate much valuable information and
useful material from travellers. Moreover, they acted as a powerful deter-
rent to potential anti-Allied agents, particularly neutral diplomats and
couriers who were in the habit of infringing diplomatic-bag regulations.^9
One of the problems associated with the conducting of searches at Tel
Kotchek was Syrian-French anxiety about the searching of sleeping cars at
Tel Kotchek because the attendants were neutral Turkish nationals. The
Free French felt that any unpleasant incident might result in the curtail-
ment of the special privileges they enjoyed on the Turkish section of the
railway between Aleppo and Nusaybin. They agreed that the Wagons-Lits
cars should be searched; however, they wanted it done on the Iraqi side of
the border. As this would have presented the FSS with significant prob-
lems, it was suggested by CICI that the CIWL attendants should be fre-
quently changed on the Aleppo-Baghdad section, and that they should be
accompanied by British inspectors between Tel Kotchek and Baghdad.^10
The Tel Kotchek loophole was at least partially plugged in 1943 by the
establishment of an Anglo-French control centre (Centre d’examination
des voyageurs [CEV]) in Aleppo. Here all passengers bound for Iraq (or
Persia) were required to surrender their passports (on the Taurus Express
immediately after crossing the Turko-Syrian border),^11 disembark, undergo
examination (interrogation and possible search), and reboard the train,
which then remained sealed until it reached Iraqi territory. At the Gare de
Baghdad in Aleppo, all exits were guarded; passengers in transit were not
permitted to leave the premises. If the examining officer was dissatisfied
with an interrogation for some reason, the passenger was not allowed to
reboard the train and was held at Aleppo until the situation was clarified,
which frequently required communication with SIME HQ in Cairo. It
was a smooth and effective operation, which spared the FSS frontier
guards at Tel Kotchek many problems. However, the main problem with
the CEV was that it was understaffed. With a purely nominal French head,
it was operated by a single SIME interrogation-section officer (T.H. Clark),
together with an administrative officer and a handful of linguists to pro-
cess in excess of 2000 travellers per month. When the volume of railway
passengers in transit threatened to overwhelm this skeleton staff, as it
frequently did, the Assistant Defence Security Officer (ADSO) Syria, his
staff, and the CEV administrative officer frequently had to spend a
considerable amount of their time examining travellers. An additional
BORDER SECURITY AND BOOTS ON THE GROUND