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appears to have been extremely clumsy, and a number of ‘incidents’ were
reported. However, CICI took the matter up formally with the British
Security Mission (BSM) in the hope of reaching a cordial agreement with
the Sureté. Following a visit to Tel Kotchek by the BSM representative at
Qamishli, there was a noticeable improvement in relations between the
Syrians and the FSS. In general, it was thought by Dawson-Shepherd in
Baghdad that attempts by both the Iraqis and the Syrians to exclude the
British from what appeared to them to be primarily internal security duties
were symptomatic of the growing and understandable desire in Iraq and
Syria for complete control within their own frontiers. However, from the
viewpoint of British security, it had to be hoped that the practical expres-
sion of such desires might be delayed for as long as possible.^18
It is difficult to imagine how one goes about sealing off an entire coun-
try from the outside world. Of all the activities required of the FSS during
the war, perhaps the most demanding was the total closure of one or more
of Iraq’s frontiers. It occasionally became necessary to do this and to
impose a simultaneous stop on all communications. Special code words to
be transmitted by GHQ before and after the operation were agreed upon,
indicating closure and cancellation of closure. The moment the closure
code word was sent out, a major operation of tremendous scale was
launched. The FSS were warned not to inform any Iraqi, Persian, Syrian,
or Turkish civil or military authorities (e.g. border guards) in advance of
closure. If asked for an explanation, they were to say that they had no
information. The FSO of 402 FSS at Khanaqin was even ordered to cut
the Khosravi-Kermanshah telephone line (across the border on Persian
territory) without arousing the suspicion of the Persian authorities.^19 As
much warning as possible, not exceeding 48 hours, was given to the FSS
formations before the imposition of a stop was required, but in the inter-
ests of security, it was frequently impossible to give a full 48-hour warning.
The reopening of frontiers and the cessation of other ancillary measures
were ordered by FSS formation commands after they had received the go-
ahead from GHQ.^20 In mid-May 1943, for example, five of the 19
Intelligence Corps sections stationed in Iraq were instructed to institute a
complete hold-up of all pedestrians and civilian road transport, including
military vehicles driven by civilians, leaving Iraq by all routes as follows: 71
FSS and 401 FSS—Rowanduz to Persia, Tel Kotchek and Sinjar to Syria,
Zakho to Turkey; 402 FSS—Mundhiriya and Zarbatiya to Persia; 403
FSS—Ramadi to Syria; trans-desert (Nairn) from Baghdad;^21 404 FSS—
Zubair to Kuwait. The only exception to these ‘stops’ were Iraq Petroleum
BORDER SECURITY AND BOOTS ON THE GROUND