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Company (IPC) and Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) personnel des-
patched on written authority to repair breakdowns in the pipeline sys-
tem.^22 Security was tight, but not impregnable. For instance, Nairn
Transport, who were due to move a large number of AIOC employees to
Syria, inadvertently leaked information about the closure in advance to the
Thomas Cook travel agency, which in turn leaked it to the United
Kingdom Commercial Corporation (UKCC). Separate instructions were
issued to the ADSO at Basra concerning the complete hold-up of all river
and sea traffic from Iraq to Persia.^23
Responsibility for closure of the railway border crossing at Tel Kotchek
fell to the two sections stationed in Mosul (71 FSS and 401 FSS). They
were instructed to work with the Iraqi State Railways (ISR) traffic man-
ager, who had been fully briefed, to stop all trains moving beyond Tel
Kotchek. This Iraqi official was responsible for issuing all technical orders
to the operational railway staff. If there were any breakdown in his chain
of command, then the FSS were ultimately responsible for ensuring that
no trains proceeded beyond Tel Kotchek. The operational measures to be
taken by 71 FSS and 401 FSS during the closure were the most complex
of all the requirements made of FSS sections. For example, entry/exit
procedures varied, depending on which type of train and/or section of
frontier was being controlled. At Tel Kotchek, the CIWL Taurus Express
was subject to different controls to those regulating mixed trains operated
by the Syrian LSB (Lignes Syriennes de Baghdad) or goods trains operated
jointly by LSB and ISR. One section of frontier for which 71 FSS was
responsible near the Assyrian village of Faysh Khabur, where the borders
of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq meet, was impossible to control. At many loca-
tions, people could evade controls by simply wading across the shallow
river. Needless to say, this area had long supported a thriving tradition of
smuggling activity, particularly across the Iraqi-Turkish border. Under
such circumstances, the FSO of 71 FSS had found it expedient to cultivate
the friendship of local officials, smugglers, and other racketeers, rather
than take drastic measures. The shrewdest course of action was to study
the tendencies of corruption and decide to what extent they constituted a
danger, if any, to British interests. Certainly, while 71 FSS saw no evidence
of direct enemy activity, they did see a good deal that might facilitate it,
and that might be of interest to the Ministry of Economic Warfare (MEW).
The real problem was that, whenever an order was suddenly received to
close the border, one could not depend on rapid, efficient implementation
of the closure by local police. On the contrary, cross-border traffic seemed