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aspect of Dawson-Shepherd’s analysis was his realization that all the poten-
tial onshore enemy agents were pro-German, whereas the offshore subma-
rine activity was clearly Japanese, and that German and Japanese interests
in the region were not identical but disconnected. Steps were being taken
to reduce the danger of submarines making contact with the shore, by
improving security control over the adjoining coast and over local native
craft (dhows and fishing boats).^35
A month later, Charles Hammill (SNOPG) had become convinced that
the landing of Axis arms shipments and/or agents in the Gulf was a myth
that had taken root in a lawless, unwatched area, and that various intelli-
gence branches had been ‘playing ping-pong’ with the repeated rumours.
The result had been that the reported incidents were conflated in the
minds of the uninitiated; they seemed more frequent and convincing than
their origin warranted.^36 Towards the end of April 1943, CICI concluded
that one enemy submarine had definitely made contact with the shore in
- Otherwise, while U-boats continued to frequent the Gulf of Oman,
they did not enter the Strait of Hormuz and operate in the Persian Gulf.^37
In mid-June 1943, Chokra Wood finally released a detailed report on
the Force KALPAK investigation in the words of the CICI officer he had
seconded as intelligence officer to Mitford’s SOE detachment. This report
was essentially the definitive concluding statement on the matter. The pur-
pose of the expedition had been twofold: (1) to capture any Axis nationals
who might be trespassing in Khuzestan, and (2) to investigate and counter
the activities of possible enemy agents who might be in contact with the
pro-Nazi Qashgai tribe and/or with enemy submarines operating off the
Gulf coast. While it was evident from the investigation that at least two
German covert operatives were indeed in the area, it would not be until
later in the year that they would be identified. The interrogations of the
RSHA VI subversion officer Franz Mayr in Tehran after his arrest in
August 1943 would reveal that the Abwehr’s Berthold Schulze-Holthus
(Abw 1 L) had been present in Qashgai tribal territory since June 1942,
together with the engineer Conny Jakob (Abw 1 M), who remained a
(harmless) fugitive until April 1945. Together their sole contribution to
the Nazi war effort had been the construction of a secret aerodrome at
Farrashband, about 175 km inland from the coast and within range for
German air raids on the Shatt al-Arab. However, an RAF reconnaissance
flight had already discovered that airfield in November 1942, and it was
clear that it had never been used (or supplied by submarine) since then,
not least because of the turning of the tides of war after El Alamein and
BORDER SECURITY AND BOOTS ON THE GROUND