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by code numbers only, as was customary, making it impossible to identify
them reliably, though one can make certain deductions from dates men-
tioned. When referring to ‘the former 82000,’ for instance, we can safely
assume that Steptoe was referring to Brian Giffey, whose relationship with
the embassy had apparently been ‘far from good.’ However, Steptoe men-
tioned various diplomats and SOE officers en clair, and his portrayal of
them was not flattering. For instance, he accused the former object of
Freya Stark’s desire, Vyvyan Holt, the oriental secretary, of having a dim
view of SIS. However, Steptoe reserved most of his vitriol for Stewart
Perowne, Aidan Philip, and Seton Lloyd, whom he openly accused of
being communist sympathizers. Perhaps more disconcerting than his criti-
cism of individuals per se was Steptoe’s inducing organizational inadequa-
cies from individual behaviours or attitudes that did not please him. He
questioned, for instance, whether it was advisable for the embassy to con-
tinue providing SIS with cover simply because he did not like Holt’s atti-
tude. Steptoe also slammed Perowne’s public-relations department
because he clearly disliked Perowne, claiming that he was aiming to sabo-
tage SIS Baghdad station, and that Perowne had attempted to penetrate
SIS through one of their W/T operators, implying that he was probably
homosexual.^20
Without minimizing the significance of SIS operations in Baghdad, it is
possible to infer from comments made by Dick White (1906–1993) (MI5,
later MI6) and Raymond Maunsell (SIME) in February 1943 that in the
Middle East the wartime role played by MI6 (or ISLD as it was known
regionally) was severely limited. Unlike in peacetime, it was restricted to
active intelligence gathering (espionage), whereas the work of SIME (and
hence CICI) concerned counterintelligence in all its operational aspects,
most notably security. In other words, SIME officers were essentially
investigators, while ISLD officers were spies. Clearly, by mid-1943 the
(now-notorious) wartime geographical overlap between the overseas roles
of MI5 and MI6 had been resolved pragmatically, especially at the local
level. Maunsell was adamant that SIME and ISLD should continue their
whole-hearted cooperation and avoid friction. This could probably, in his
opinion, be more easily achieved at outstations than in Cairo, just as it was
easier in Cairo than in the UK. He warned, however, that MI6 were taking
more active measures to establish themselves in counterintelligence in the
Middle East—presumably targeting the Russians, not the Germans, as the
Soviet threat to British regional interests became ever more apparent. It
was therefore the duty of Defence Security Officers (DSOs) to direct
SIX: HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE